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BOOK REVIEWS
Property and Liberty Reconsidered
THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS. By James W. Ely, Jr.* New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992. Pp. x, 193. $32.50.
Reviewed by Herman Belz**
This perceptive, lucid, and sympathetic account of property rights
in American constitutional law by Professor James W. Ely, Jr., is fur-
ther evidence of the conservative challenge to liberal orthodoxy that has
emerged in recent years in American historiography. That the book ap-
pears under the cosponsorship of the Organization of American Histori-
ans, one of the more militantly liberal scholarly associations in the
United States, is a small but significant sign of the changing intellectual
climate.
As conceived of in contemporary liberal historiography, protection
of individual property rights is but one element of economic liberty.
Equally if not more important, according to the legal historian Harry
N. Scheiber, are the public duties and obligations of property owner-
ship, which give rise to the idea of economic liberty as a legal construct
embracing "the whole of the citizenry and .. .the prosperity of the
larger society."1 In contrast to this view, Professor Ely bases his consti-
tutional history of property rights on the traditional concept of eco-
nomic liberty as an attribute of individual rights that is essential to
personal and political liberty. Maintaining a focus on the text of the
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law; Professor of History, Vanderbilt
University.
** Professor of History, University of Maryland.
1. Harry N. Scheiber, Economic Liberty and the Constitution, in Essays in the History of
Liberty: Seaver Institute Lectures at the Huntington Library 75, 77 (Huntington Library, 1988).
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Constitution as a standard of historical judgment within changing polit-
ical, social, and ideological contexts, Ely employs a historical method
that incorporates the perspective of the framer's intent and rejects the
relativistic assumptions of liberal historicism.
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE NEW DEAL
A volume in the Bicentennial Essays on the Bill of Rights intended
for instruction in college history courses, The Guardian of Every Other
Right summarizes American constitutional development from the
standpoint of economic liberty and property rights. The basic argument
of the book is that economic liberty is an essential component of consti-
tutionalism; property rights are a means of limiting government power
over individuals; and a free market economy based on private property
ownership is beneficial to society as a whole. Although a broad popular
consensus has supported the institution of private property in the
United States, Ely observes that there has nevertheless been continuous
conflict over economic liberty. This has resulted primarily from the dy-
namic nature of property as an institution and from the tendency to-
ward intergovernmental conflict inherent in the political system of
federalism. Controversy over the forms and content of economic liberty
has raised the further question of which branch of government under
the separation of powers principle should decide conflicts over economic
policy. Although in republican government the political branches have
the primary responsibility for policymaking, the obligation of the judici-
ary to uphold the Constitution has given the Supreme Court a key role
in reconciling conflicts over economic liberty. Accordingly, judicial deci-
sions concerning property rights form a central focus of the book.
Ely writes from a Lockean liberal perspective that emphasizes the
democratic character of private property ownership as a social institu-
tion. He describes the emergence in the colonial period of a middle class
society based on widespread land ownership. Although wealth was un-
evenly divided and class stratification existed, economic advancement
was within the reach of most colonists, and even day laborers could
earn enough money to buy land. Contemporary English Whig political
thought accorded with and reinforced developmental tendencies in the
economics of colonial settlement by affirming the sanctity of property
rights. To be sure, the property owner's dominion over his land was not
absolute, as numerous customary restrictions and government regula-
tions attest. In Ely's view, however, these mercantilist regulations were
more formal than effective, and did not prevent the emergence of a free
market in goods and services in fact, if not in law.
In seeking national independence the American people acted on
the proposition, as expressed by Arthur Lee of Virginia, that "[tihe
1016 [Vol. 45:1015
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right of property is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive the
people of this, is in fact to deprive them of their liberty."' 2 Accepting
the truth of this contention, Ely says that "liberty and property" was
the motto of the revolutionary movement. Despite the affirmation of
property rights in the state constitutions, however, economic liberty was
rendered insecure by antiproperty measures directed at loyalists and
creditors by some revolutionary state legislatures. In response to this
threat, conservative political reformers in the Federal Convention of
1787 created a new form of liberal republican government that afforded
greater protection for property.
In addition to giving the national legislature power to tax and regu-
late commerce for purposes of economic development, the Constitution
protected private and public contracts against impairment by state gov-
ernments. The Fifth Amendment, added to the Constitution in 1791,
confirmed the fundamental importance of private property ownership
by declaring that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, and by providing that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation. Ely states that
these constitutional safeguards of economic liberty met popular ap-
proval in a society in which private property was broadly distributed.
They were intended, he observes unapologetically, to project the new
nation into the mainstream of acquisitive capitalism.
While acknowledging that property and economic issues figured
largely in the making of the Constitution, Ely rejects the Beardian or
progressive interpretation, which views the framers as acting out of self-
interested or class-conscious motives. According to Ely, the basic flaw
in the progressive account is its failure philosophically to grasp the fact
that property ownership is a necessary institution for the existence of
political liberty. Noting that economic issues were little discussed in the
ratification debate, and that no one questioned the concept of private
property, he argues that the main issue between the Federalists and
Anti-Federalists was whether the states or the national government
would have the principal authority to regulate commerce and protect
property.
The central theme in Ely's constitutional history of property rights
from 1789 to the present is the problem of accommodating the demands
of economic growth and social change with the security of settled prop-
erty rights. The issue is controversial because the security of property
2. James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right 26 (Oxford, 1992) (quoting Arthur
Lee, An Appeal to the Justice and Interests of the People of Great Britain, in The Present Dis-
pute with America 14 (4th ed. 1775)).




rights is an essential condition for attracting the investment capital
needed for economic development, yet economic development provokes
political and social pressures that result in efforts to restrict or alter
property relationships in the name of the public interest or a more
democratic conception of economic liberty. This problem was less con-
spicuous in the nineteenth century, when the imperative of economic
development was clear and the necessity of releasing productive private
energies could not be denied. State governments regulated property and
economic activity, but according to Ely regulatory measures were nar-
rowly conceived, did not aim at redistribution of wealth, and left own-
ers and entrepreneurs substantially free to use their property in socially
productive ways. Furthermore, the federal judiciary consistently pro-
tected existing economic arrangements, preventing state legislatures in
particular from interfering with property rights.
In the late nineteenth century, in the context of industrialization
and the transformation of American economic life caused by the corpo-
rate form of business organization, conflict over the nature of economic
liberty increased. Social dislocation and the unequal distribution of
wealth, inherent features of a free market society, for the first time be-
came prominent enough to call into existence political movements
aimed at redistributing wealth and regulating the operation of the mar-
ket. From the standpoint of progressive reformers the purpose of gov-
ernment regulation, according to Ely, was to correct the imbalance of
economic power and preserve economic competition. Proponents of the
free market, on the other hand, appealed to the traditional conception
of economic democracy and insisted on the necessary connection be-
tween economic and political liberty.
Ely follows recent revisionist scholarship in attributing to laissez-
faire judges and legal commentators a genuine concern for democratic
principle in opposing the demands for class legislation that emanated
both from political reformers and business lobbyists.4 He contends that
the basic policy objective of laissez-faire constitutionalism-namely, to
facilitate the formation of investment capital necessary for economic
growth-was sound. Furthermore, he regards as reasonable, the devel-
opment of new legal concepts for the protection of property, the most
important of which was judicial determination of the reasonableness of
state police power regulations. In telling the familiar story of substan-
tive due process and liberty of contract under the Fourteenth Amend-
4. Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-evaluation of the Meaning and
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 Law & Hist. Rev. 293 (1985); Charles W. McCurdy,
Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism 1863-1897, 61 J. Am. Hist. 970 (1975); Mary C. Porter, That
Commerce Shall Be Free: A New Look at the Old Laissez-Faire Court, 1976 S. Ct. Rev. 135.
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ment, Ely, within the limits of a synthetic account, adds to our
knowledge in his discussion of judicial interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment takings clause. Tracing the conflict between proponents of
regulation and laissez-faire constitutionalists from 1900 to the 1930s, he
concludes that while the Supreme Court generally accepted regulatory
measures directed to health, safety, and moral concerns, its paramount
objective was to maintain entrepreneurial liberty. Ely notes that in pur-
suing this goal the Court did not systematically favor business
enterprise.
From an historiographical point of view, the chief interest of The
Guardian of Every Other Right is its unsentimental interpretation of
the New Deal. More than most writers on the subject, Ely sees the poli-
cies of the Roosevelt administration, confirmed by the Supreme Court
after the Court-packing episode of 1937, as marking a decisive and
profound break in the constitutional tradition. Ely argues that New
Deal liberalism rejected limited government, marketplace competition,
and respect for property rights. Asserting the idea that government has
an affirmative duty to promote the general welfare, New Deal liberals
introduced into public policy a distinction between personal civil rights
and liberties, which were accorded a preferred position in constitutional
law, and property rights, which were relegated to an inferior status less
worthy of judicial protection. In Ely's view this distinction, still funda-
mental in contemporary liberal jurisprudence, was a purely judicial
fabrication that has no basis in the Constitution. The Constitution, he
points out, contains express guarantees of property rights and makes no
division of rights into categories. In a further departure from the consti-
tutional tradition, the Supreme Court interpreted the commerce clause
to give Congress power to regulate any economic activity in the United
States. Ely writes: "It was difficult, however, to square plenary congres-
sional authority over all commerce with the basic constitutional notion
of a limited federal government of enumerated powers. '
As the appeal of New Deal liberalism eroded under the burden of
the regulatory state and the pressure of continuing social and economic
change, the Supreme Court began once again to recognize constitutional
guarantees of property rights. In the past two decades the Court has
applied the contract clause as a limitation on the state police power,
curbed state interference with the national free trade market under the
dormant commerce power, and revived the notion of regulatory takings
under the Fifth Amendment. Nevertheless, the Court has neither chal-
lenged the use of the commerce and taxing powers to create a national
government of unlimited authority, nor attempted to resuscitate eco-
5. Ely, Guardian of Every Other Right at 129 (cited in note 2).
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nomic due process. Although some Justices have questioned the distinc-
tion between civil rights and property rights, the Supreme Court has
not disturbed the rationality standard of judicial review under which
state and federal legislatures can interfere with property rights with
impunity.
II. PROPERTY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRUDENCE
Challenging the historical relativism that so often passes for consti-
tutional theory in contemporary legal scholarship, Ely offers for our
consideration an historical methodology that embraces the perspective
of original intent jurisprudence. Observing that constitutional law is
shaped in a broad political and intellectual context, he "proposes an
analytical framework to guide historical investigation."'6 Ely's analytical
framework consists of three principles: (1) that the framers of the Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights envisioned some degree of federal judi-
cial review of the substance of economic legislation; (2) that the
relegation of property rights to a subordinate constitutional status is
not historically warranted in view of the framers' concern with protect-
ing property and nearly 150 years of Supreme Court activity toward
this end; and (3) that property, one of several fundamental values pro-
tected under the Constitution, is not entitled to preferential treatment.
While apparently presented as historical in nature, these principles
or propositions are not strictly or narrowly historical. They possess in
addition a normative dimension and are intended to have the practical
effect of reminding us that property is a constitutional right, which in a
properly ordered regime ought not be consigned to the sphere of politi-
cal expediency and legislative and bureaucratic discretion. Ely recog-
nizes the necessity for prudential judgment about the nature and extent
of private property protection in relation to the public interest; he
therefore properly denies any intent to settle specific policy questions
dealing with this issue. His larger and more important purpose is to
assist in the historical process of elevating policy controversy over eco-
nomic liberty to the level of constitutional law. Such a development
would not eliminate the need for prudence in determinations about
property rights, but it would place limits on policymaking. Constitu-
tional prudence is different from the practical reason of ordinary polit-
ics because the Constitution, in Ely's view, in fundamental respects has
a fixed and judicially unalterable meaning that guides and controls in-
terpretation. In this approach to constitutional history the Constitution
is not whatever politicians, judges, and commentators say it is.
We can explore Ely's historical method by examining further his
6. Id. at 9.
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treatment of the New Deal. The dichotomy between property rights
and personal liberties, announced by Justice Stone in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.,7 amounted to the creation of a double standard
of judicial review. Affording a higher level of judicial protection to per-
sonal rights, the Supreme Court dismissed property rights, conferring
on the government a dispensation whereby it could redress social ills,
resolve conflicts, regulate business, and intervene in the economy.
"Judged from a historical perspective," Ely writes, "the theory underly-
ing Carolene Products was problematic. The fundamental constitu-
tional dilemma . . . is that the framers of the Constitution assigned a
much higher standing to property ownership than did the New Deal
liberals."' He adds that the distinction between property rights and
personal liberties contradicted the framers' belief that rights are closely
related and that protection of property ownership is essential to politi-
cal liberty. Moreover, "the Constitution does not divide rights into cate-
gories," and specific property guarantees in the document are
irreconcilable with the subordination of property rights to civil rights.9
It seems fair to conclude that the "historical perspective" employed
in this analysis might more accurately be described as an historical-con-
stitutional standard. Defined by the intent of the framers as expressed
in the text of the Constitution, it is charged with normative implica-
tions of a moral and political nature. Rejecting the liberal historicist
concept of a living Constitution, Ely judges the New Deal to be not
merely problematic, but plainly unconstitutional.
Sound historical method requires the writer of history to consider
ideas and events from the viewpoint of contemporary actors and par-
ticipants. To some extent Ely meets this obligation in stating that New
Deal liberals believed, in the words of Justice Brandeis, that "[t]here
must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through exper-
imentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing
social and economic needs."10 Liberals also justified the New Deal, how-
ever, by invoking the constitutionalism of the founding fathers. They
argued that as the framers created a limited government and made po-
litical power accountable to the people, so their generation would limit
private economic power and render it constitutionally accountable to
the popular will. President Roosevelt accordingly spoke of an economic
Bill of Rights that would establish the principle of consent in the do-
main of private government that existed in the legal form of the corpo-
7. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
8. Ely, Guardian of Every Other Right at 133-34 (cited in note 2).
9. Id. at 134.
10. Id. at 119 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)).
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ration and private property." In this view the New Deal can be justified
as consistent with the constitutional tradition.
While not acknowledging this New Deal argument, Ely indirectly
engages it in noting that the double standard of judicial review, based
on the distinction between property rights and personal liberties, be-
came a new orthodoxy after 1937. In effect he concedes it a degree of
constitutional legitimacy deriving from the political approval conferred
on New Deal antiproperty measures by the electorate. Ely thus recog-
nizes that public opinion shapes and imposes limits on constitutional
interpretation. He addresses this issue more explicitly in discussing the
problem of property rights and political democracy.
As noted, Ely views protection of property rights as a fundamental
purpose of the American Revolution that became a matter of constitu-
tional consensus in the new nation. Guarantees of private property were
therefore written into the state and national constitutions. Notwith-
standing these constitutional safeguards, antiproperty measures were
enacted in the revolutionary period and have continued to appear with
disturbing regularity throughout American history. Ely states that this
development was paradoxical; he sees the antiproperty tendency as in-
consistent with political democracy rather than as a logical expression
of democracy. As a matter of constitutional history if not democratic
theory, however, Ely accepts the conflict between property and democ-
racy. It becomes the basis in his account of the Supreme Court's key
function of settling disputes between the need of government to regu-
late economic activity and the right of individuals and corporations to
enjoy their property. 2
This historical conclusion in turn guides Ely's constitutionalist
teaching. He writes: "The Supreme Court must carefully adjust the de-
mands of political democracy with the explicit protection of property
ownership contained in the Constitution.' 3 History, following the
course indicated by the framers, has given the Court this role. In per-
forming its task the Court has to allow some interference with property
in order to prevent disparities of wealth that threaten political and so-
cial stability, and also to preserve economic opportunity for persons
who do not own property. On the other hand, Ely says the Supreme
Court has to protect property lest this vital social institution exist not
as a matter of fundamental constitutional right but only under the dis-
cretion and at the sufferance of the legislature and the political opinion
11. Robert Eden, The New Deal Revaluation of Partisanship, in Peter Schramm, ed., Amer-
ican Political Parties and Constitutional Politics (University Press of America and The John Ash-
brook Center, forthcoming, 1992).
12. Ely, Guardian of Every Other Right at 153 (cited in note 2).
13. Id. at 154.
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on which it is dependent. Yet he states that property rights are always
upheld within the parameters of democratic public opinion. In the final
analysis, therefore, Ely asserts that "property rights, like all individual
rights, rest[] on broad acceptance.
14
If this conclusion smacks unduly of democratic positivism, sug-
gesting that the voice of the majority is the ultimate authority in the
constitutional system, Ely's historical account shows that a formative
influence on public opinion has been the fact that property rights are
written into the Constitution as an expression of the framers' intent. As
against the tendency of some commentators to jettison political democ-
racy in order to protect infinitely expanding rights claims under judicial
government, Ely's judicious and balanced account reminds us that lib-
erty and property are historically and politically related, and that
through constitutional prudence faithful to the purposes of the found-
ing it is possible to maintain a proper balance between property rights
and majority rule.
14. Id. at 156.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Liberals have long regarded the First Amendment's freedom of the
press guarantee as their special plaything.' For most of this century,
liberals have dominated the scholarship and the doctrinal debate on the
freedom of the press. They have often urged the federal courts to estab-
lish the press as "a fourth institution outside the Government as an
* Associate Professor, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, the College of William and Mary.
B.A., Yale University; M.Sc., London School of Economics; J.D., University of Chicago. I am grate-
ful to Paul LeBel, David Logan, and Ron Wright for their generous comments on earlier drafts.
1. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. Const., Amend. I.
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additional check on the three official branches."2 Liberal judges have
ensured virtual autonomy for the print media through the cumulative
effect of their rulings to immunize the press from damages for the pub-
lication of falsehoods about public figures unless the publication was
done knowingly, recklessly, or with actual malice; to bar public access
to newspapers; and to treat prior restraints of publications as presump-
tively unconstitutional. At the same time, the courts have not barred
liberal lawmakers from regulating broadcasters to promote fairness and
to prevent chaos in public debate on the airwaves.
The liberal approach to the freedom of the press, however, seem-
ingly stands on the brink of dismantlement. The present Supreme
Court has "an activist outlook of'the most virulent and blinding sort"
under which the dominating conservative Justices "selective[ly] en-
force[] .. .rights generally supporting state power and eroding liberta-
rian values."' Indeed, no one currently on the Court is a staunch
defender of an autonomous press, and the Court has already made some
minor changes to, or at least refused to extend, the freedom of the press
doctrine. 5 Meanwhile, polls indicate that the popularity of the press is
plummeting, and liberals have taken a beating from the left and the
right' that has cost them considerable political and judicial power.7
2. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L. J. 631, 634 (1975).
3. For a description of the system under which the print media enjoys virtual autonomy and
the broadcast media is subjected to various regulations, see generally Ithiel de S. Pool, Technolo-
gies of Freedom (1983).
4. Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What
the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 Harv. L. Rev. 80, 83, 151 (1991).
5. See, for example, Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, 111 S.Ct. 2513 (1991) (holding that
the First Amendment does not prohibit a source from recovering damages under promissory estop-
pel law for a publisher's breach of promise of confidentiality given in exchange for information);
Masson v. New York Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991) (stating that under California law the
evidence raised a jury question as to whether an author acted with the requisite knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of several cited passages); Leathers v. Medlock,
111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (holding that Arkansas' extension of its generally applicable sales tax to
cable television services alone, or to cable and satellite services, but not to the print media, does
not violate the First Amendment); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990) (hold-
ing that a separate constitutional privilege for "opinion," in addition to established safeguards
regarding defamation, was not required to ensure the freedom of expression guaranteed by the
First Amendment and that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that a reporter's column imply-
ing that a high school coach perjured himself was sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being
proved true or false and might permit defamation recovery). But see Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991)- (unanimously striking
down on First Amendment grounds a New York law that required an accused or convicted crimi-
nal to deposit income from works describing his crime in an escrow account available to the vic-
tims of the crime and the criminal's other creditors).
6. Leftist critics argue, for example, that liberals have not done enough to eliminate or rem-
edy discrimination against minorities. See, for example, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Femi-
nist Theory of the State (Harvard, 1989); Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Save& The Elusive
Quest for Racial Justice (Basic Books, 1987); Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts
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Sensing that, for the time being, liberals may still dominate the
playing field of the First Amendment, three liberal law profes-
sors-Dean Lee Bollinger of the University of Michigan Law School,
Professor Lucas Powe of the University of Texas Law School, and Pro-
fessor Rodney Smolla of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the Col-
lege of William and Mary-have stepped into the breach to offer
solutions to the dilemma of defending the freedom of the press in an
age in which neither liberals nor the press is popular and in which the
courts are overwhelmingly unreceptive to liberal values. In Images of a
Free Press8 Bollinger suggests that this dilemma is illusory, while Powe
in The Fourth Estate and the Constitution9 argues for the elimination
of almost any governmental regulation of the print media. Smolla in
Free Speech in an Open Society ° contends that, properly understood,
the First Amendment guarantees virtually absolute freedom of speech
and of the press and should serve as a model for the rest of the world to
follow.
Bollinger, Powe, and Smolla show that liberals still have plenty to
say to the Court (if it will listen), elected officials, academicians, stu-
dents, and the general public about the freedom of the press. Their
books reveal the diversity of thought among liberals and shed light on
the reasons for the seemingly unstable status of a complex liberal tradi-
tion of commentary on the freedom of the press.
In the context of the freedom of the press, this Review seeks to
illustrate the ways in which these three authors differ in their efforts to
evade the common criticisms leveled at liberal scholars.11 Part II posits
that the paradigmatic liberal inquiry under the First Amendment in-
volves asking who can best be trusted to protect the values associated
with the freedom of the press, particularly maintaining respectable
public debate and effectively checking governmental abuses. The ob-
on Common Cause, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1991). Commentators on the right criticize liberals for not
doing enough to prevent the courts from interfering on unprincipled bases with the legitimate
decisionmaking of the elected branches of government. See, for example, Robert H. Bork, The
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (Free Press, 1990); Gary L. McDowell,
Curbing the Courts: The Constitution and the Limits of Judicial Power (L.S.U., 1988); Raoul
Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Harvard,
1977). For one perspective on how liberals should respond to criticisms from the left and the right,
see Ronald K. L. Collins and David M. Skover, Commentary: The Future of Liberal Legal Schol-
arship, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 189 (1988).
7. See Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 44-47
(1990) (suggesting a decline in the respect for and influence of liberalism).
8. Lee C. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press (Chicago, 1991).
9. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Fourth Estate and the Constitution: Freedom of the Press in
America (U. of Cal., 1991).
10. Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society (Knopf, 1992).
11. See sources cited in note 6.
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jects of trust or distrust are the Supreme Court, elected officials, the
public, and the press itself. Part III briefly describes the distinctively
liberal arguments made by Bollinger, Powe, and Smolla in their new
books. Part IV exposes the complexity underlying liberal commentary
on the freedom of the press by focusing on the disagreement among
Bollinger, Powe, and Smolla about who is best situated, given changing
political and social conditions, to foster and protect the values the
framers hoped to promote through the constitutional guarantee of the
freedom of the press. Part V identifies some reasons for and conse-
quences of the lack of a strong conservative counterpart to the liberal
tradition of defending the freedom of the press. Part V suggests that
the absence of conservative voices in this arena may reflect (1) a split
between social conservatives and libertarians (similar to the liberals' in-
fighting) over whether the government can perform a positive role in
the First Amendment context and (2) the resulting freedom of liberals
such as Bollinger, Powe, and Smolla to inculcate in lawmakers and the
citizenry certain moral and political values regarding the freedom of the
press and to develop fora for protecting the freedom of the press apart
from the stereotypical liberal option of an ever vigilant and active
judiciary.
II. THE PARADIGMATIC LIBERAL VISION OF THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
The paradigmatic liberal approach to the freedom of the press asks
who society can trust-the press, the Supreme Court, or elected offi-
cials-to act most effectively in achieving and protecting the values as-
sociated with the First Ainendment's guarantee of the freedom of the
press. First, many liberals believe that the First Amendment guarantees
an autonomous press. They trust the press to monitor itself, to check
governmental abuse, and to perform in an ethically responsible and
professional manner. Thus, Justice Hugo Black, who took an absolutist
approach to the First Amendment, argued for a press completely free
from governmental regulation: "The press [exists] to serve the gov-
erned, not the governors. . . . [It is] protected so that it [can] bare the
secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unre-
strained press can effectively expose deception in government." 2
Second, liberals often argue that the federal courts can be trusted
more than the state 3 to enforce the values embodied in the First
12. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (The Pentagon Papers
Case). Similarly, Justice Potter Stewart argued that the First Amendment protects "the institu-
tional autonomy of the press." Stewart, 26 Hastings L. J. at 634 (cited in note 2).




Amendment. This argument rests on an abiding faith in the federal
courts to engage in a flexible or even absolutist (but not unprincipled)
interpretation of the First Amendment. For example, in New York
Times v. Sullivan14-perhaps the most important decision in this cen-
tury on the freedom of the press-Justice William Brennan, writing on
behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court, explained that the "central
meaning" of the First Amendment guaranteed a citizen the right to
criticize his government in order to facilitate the search for truth and
democratic decisionmaking. He argued that the First Amendment re-
flected the nation's "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.' 5 He
stressed further that a "citizen critic" must enjoy a qualified privilege
from civil damages in order to perform his societal duty.' 6 Conse-
quently, the Court held that a plaintiff must prove actual malice to suc-
ceed in a defamation action.'
7
Liberal faith in the Supreme Court's capacity to protect the press
often accompanies a corresponding distrust in the state's ability to craft
even-handed and fair regulation of the press. This distrust stems from a
belief that the state censors the press because the press has the power
to embarrass the state. As Professor Thomas Scanlan observed, "where
political issues are involved governments are notoriously partisan and
unreliable.""' Justice Louis Brandeis put it even more dramatically:
Governmental power is dangerous because "[m]en feared witches and
burnt women."' 9
Third, in contrast to liberals who adhere to one or both of the posi-
tions described above, many liberals trust the state to make balanced
laws for the regulation of both economic and noneconomic matters. In
the 1930s, most Justices agreed to defer to economic governmental reg-
ulations; they upheld New Deal legislation restructuring the public and
private sectors in order to create conditions under which certain free-
doms, such as the right to contract, could flourish and competing inter-
ests could be properly balanced for the sake of the greater public
14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
15. Id. at 270.
16. Id. at 277-79.
17. The Court defined "actual malice" as "knowledge that [the publication] was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280, 285-86. Justices Black, Douglas, and
Goldberg concurred, arguing for an absolute privilege. Id. at 293-97 (Black concurring), and at 297-
305 (Goldberg concurring).
18. Thomas M. Scanlan, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 519, 534 (1979).
19. Whitney VV. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis concurring).
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good." By 1941, Professor Zachariah Chafee-perhaps the most promi-
nent liberal First Amendment scholar in this century-recognized the
potential in this reasoning for permitting limited regulation of the
press. In his influential treatise, Free Speech in the United States,"1
Chafee argued that freedom of expression requires the government to
provide fora for public debate on important political issues as a critical,
if not indispensable, means to improve the quality of both the press and
democratic decisionmaking. He feared that without such governmental
assistance, unrestrained private interests would interfere with the free
exchange of ideas.
Even though the post-New Deal Justices could not reach a consen-
sus on whether to defer to regulation of so-called noneconomic liberties,
they did agree to uphold various regulations of the broadcasting indus-
try. In 1943, for example, the Court in National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States22 rejected First Amendment challenges to government
regulation of the broadcast media for the first time. The Court upheld
the "chain broadcasting rules," through which the Federal Communica-
tions Commission had sought to impose limits on the degree of auton-
omy a licensee could give up when joining a broadcasting network. a
Using the "scarcity rationale," the Court rejected the plaintiff's First
Amendment objection to the regulatory scheme. The scarcity rationale
posits that because more people want to broadcast than the airwaves
have room to accommodate, the government is in the best position to
determine who should receive broadcast licenses based on its perception
of "the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity.' "24
Similarly, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Federal Communi-
cations Commission 5-a case as important to the broadcast media as
Sullivan is to the print media-a unanimous Court upheld the fairness
doctrine, which requires that broadcasters present controversial issues
of public importance to their audiences and ensure that both sides of
the issue are available.26 Relying again on the scarcity rationale, the
20. .See generally J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to
the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L. J. 375, 387-94.
21. Zachariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (Harvard, 1941). Chafee dedicated
the book to Judge Learned Hand, one of the most influential commentators and jurists on the
freedom of the press. For example, Judge Hand authored Masses Publication Co. v. Patten, 244
F.2d 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1917), an influential lower court opinion setting
forth a strong standard for protecting speech critical of the government.
22. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
23. The commission designed these regulations to manage various aspects of a network's re-
lationship with its affiliated stations. Id. at 198-209.
24. Id. at 226-27.
25. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
26. Justice Byron White, the author of Red Lion, has personally rejected the view of an
autonomous press: He has characterized the press as a "private-interest group rather than an insti-
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Court reasoned that the differences between the print and broadcast
media-reflected in noise restrictions on the use of voice amplifying
equipment and the finite number of usable broadcast frequen-
cies-justified the different kinds of regulatory treatment they
received.
2 7
Changing social, political, and legal conditions, however, increas-
ingly have forced liberals to recognize the tension between the different
elements of the standard liberal position on the freedom of the press.
For example, Sullivan has posed several problems, including the escala-
tion of damages in libel actions and the discouragement of qualified
people from government service because they wish to avoid the highly
invasive press coverage that Sullivan permits. Moreover, the intended
beneficiaries of the standard liberal arguments regarding the freedom of
the press-unpopular or politically powerless speakers or groups-often
lack the resources to be heard in the public marketplace and therefore
cannot get their messages to the intended audiences without govern-
mental assistance. Hence, they now demand government support in ob-
taining access to government-owned property and information and to
the outlets of private media. In addition, liberals face such tough inter-
related issues as whether the print media is at least as limited in num-
bers of outlets as the broadcast media and consequently exceeds the
allowable level of concentration for purposes of deserving autonomy
status under the First Amendment, and whether broadcast regulation
has worked well enough to serve as a model for regulation of the print
tution with a central function to perform in the constitutional system of checks and balances."
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. Bar. Found. Res. J.
521, 593 (1977). Even though Justice White was also a long-time critic of Sullivan, see Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 68, 126-27 (1991), the Court's unanimous decision in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988) (refusing in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist to allow an "end-run-around"
Sullivan by rejecting a tort action against the publisher of a parody of a public figure for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress), indicates that his lonely battle to fundamentally re-
work libel law clearly has failed.
27. Only five years after Red Lion, the Supreme Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), rejected a plea from Professor Jerome Barron to apply the rationale
of Red Lion to the print media. Barron's argument drew from his work as a prominent liberal
advocate favoring the Court's application of similar regulations to both the broadcast and print
media. See Jerome Barron, Access-the Only Choice for the Media?, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 766 (1970);
Jerome Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 487 (1969); Jerome Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 1641 (1967). Nevertheless, in Tornillo, the Court unanimously agreed to strike down a Florida
law that required newspapers within the state to publish without cost the reply of any political
candidate criticized in its columns. The Tornillo Court reasoned that the print media cases stood
for the proposition that "any. . .compulsion [by the government on newspapers] to publish that
which "reason" tells them should not be published' is unconstitutional." 418 U.S. at 256. Access
regulation violates that principle because it intrudes on "the function of editors" and presumably
chills news content. Id. at 258.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
media. The realities of press ownership and behavior and of the conse-
quences of governmental regulation are forcing liberals to reconsider
their positions on the freedom of the press and to do so before a hostile
audience.
III. THREE LIBERAL ANSWERS TO PROBLEMS WITH THE FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS
Bollinger, Powe, and Smolla are unabashedly liberal in their focus
on clarifying the nature of the First Amendment's freedom of the press
guarantee.2" Their shared orientation is that the First Amendment re-
quires a substantial degree of either judicial or governmental activity or
both to protect the values the framers hoped to promote through the
freedom of the press guarantee. Below I consider in turn each author's
distinctively liberal arguments regarding the freedom of the press.
Bollinger argued in his previous book, The Tolerant Society: Free-
dom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America,2 9 that the First
Amendment guarantees robust political debate, including hate speech
directed at minorities, to "help[] . . . shape the intellectual character of
the society."30 In his new book Bollinger returns to his first and pre-
dominant interest: Explicating our system of partial regulation of the
media. 1 He is particularly concerned with exposing the nature and im-
plications of the "images"-unexplored or unproven assumptions or be-
liefs-that we have developed with respect to the freedom of the
press.2
Much of Bollinger's book is aimed at exposing the flaws in the
"central image" of the freedom of the press that Sullivan has fos-
tered. He explains that Sullivan has spawned a jurisprudence on the
28. Professor West suggests that liberal legal scholars "agree on the basic [premise] that in-
dividual freedom is the primary, if not the only, moral end of political organization [and] generally
insist that individual freedom is best ensured by protecting and respecting individual rights."
West, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 46 (cited in note 7). See also Rogers Smith, Liberalism and American
Constitutional Law 14 (Harvard, 1985) (submitting that "[1]iberalism's most distinctive feature is
thus its insistence that government should be limited so as to free individuals to undertake private
as well as public pursuits of happiness, even if this option erodes public spiritedness in practice").
29. Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in
America (Oxford, 1986).
30. Id. at 107.
31. See, for example, Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward
a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1976); Lee C. Bolinger,
Jr., Elitism, The Masses and the Idea of Self Government: Ambivalence About the "Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," in Ronald K. L. Collins, ed., Constitutional Government in
America 99 (Carolina Academic, 1980); Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., The Rationality of Public Regulation
of the Media, in Judith Lichtenberg, ed., Democracy and the Mass Media (Cambridge, 1990).
32. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 44 (cited in note 8).
33. Id. at 2, 133.
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freedom of the press that rests on a flawed image, whose critical fea-
tures are
[a] government [that] is untrustworthy when it comes to regulating public debate,
for it will forever try to recapture its authoritarian powers through laws such as
seditious libel[;] a public that is incapable of gathering for itself all the information
it requires to exercise its sovereign authority; and a press that performs a vital role
in helping, through its powers of investigation and exposure, to reduce the risks of
official incompetence and abuse, to convey information about the affairs of govern-
ment, and to serve as a forum for citizens to communicate among themselves. 34
According to Bollinger, this "central image" is flawed because it has
generated a confused patchwork of decisions on the freedom of the
press, and has not produced more responsible press behavior or im-
proved the quality of public debate.3 5 Further, it has led people to auto-
matically distrust government regulation of the media even though such
regulation has not always harmed the freedom of the press. Bollinger
also points out that scholars have not fully appreciated the realities of
partial regulation.
Bollinger posits that Sullivan's central image has had two negative
effects on the freedom of the press. First, it has discouraged many
scholars from studying the social harm that may result from the spread
of falsehoods and other politically and socially useless information in
the public domain. Bollinger is concerned that the individual harms
perpetrated by false publications can subvert the quality of public de-
bate because those publications may confuse people about what is re-
ally at stake in political discourse and dissuade people from entering
government service to avoid subjection to sensational press coverage.3 6
He suggests that we cannot fully appreciate the harmful effects of Sulli-
van's central image and the ways in which we can eliminate them (with
governmental assistance) until we have developed an empirically sound
''psychology of the people" to study how the public develops its images
of the press and how it processes and reacts to the information to which
34. Id. at 20, 44.
35. See id. at 57-58. In contrast to Bollinger, Professor Harry Kalven praised Sullivan for
signaling the start of a journey that would lead the Court to protect all speech needed for genuine
public debate. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 S. Ct. Rev. 191. He concluded that "[tihe closing question . . .is
whether the treatment of seditious libel as the key concept for development of appropriate consti-
tutional doctrine will prove germinal." Id. at 221. Though Kalven thought it "not easy to predict
what the Court will see in the Times opinion as the years roll by," he believed that Sullivan
"invit[ed the Court] to follow a dialectic progression from public official to government policy to
public policy to matters in the public domain, like art." Id. But see David Logan, Tort Law and
the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 493, 496, 568-73 (1990) (sug-
gesting that Sullivan did not make inevitable the dialetic progression Kalven predicted, including
the confusing patchwork of decisions we now have on the freedom of the press).
36. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 36, 37, 144, 145 (cited in note 8).
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it is exposed." Moreover, in Bollinger's opinion, we need to develop a
"psychology of the press" to determine whether economic incentives in-
hibit the media from improving the quality of public debate on impor-
tant issues. 8
Second, Bollinger believes that Sullivan's central image has fos-
tered an unreasonable distrust of media regulation. He fears that Sulli-
van's influence makes people less receptive to a system of partial
regulation and discourages both examination of how partial regulation
comports with the First Amendment and recognition of the similarities
between the broadcasting and print media. 9 Once we have exposed the
similarities between the different kinds of media, the flaws in Sullivan's
"central image," the nature of people's psychology, and the press's ca-
pacity to abuse its discretion, we will be able to consider whether
broadcast regulation has succeeded. If it has succeeded, according to
Bollinger, we should then consider application of the beneficial aspects
of broadcast regulation to the print media.40
In contrast to Bollinger, who seeks to provide "a series of reflec-
tions" rather than a "treatise" on the freedom of the press,4" Powe
presents a bland but thorough study of the cases and the laws gov-
erning the print media. Powe's new book, when read in conjunction
with his previous one, American Broadcasting and the First Amend-
ment,42 forms a rebuttal to Bollinger's Images of a Free Press. In much
the same spirit as he earlier argued that broadcast regulation should be
abandoned as unworkable, Powe makes the case in his new book against
regulation of the print media. Although much of what Powe says is uno-
riginal, he brings together all of the constitutional arguments favoring a
virtually autonomous print media.
Powe's study comprises three parts. Part I provides a comprehen-
sive look at the history of the freedom of the press. In Powe's opinion,
all relevant evidence-including the original understanding of the free-
dom of the press, the government's propensity to censor the press in
times of crisis, and the Supreme Court's significant decisions on free-
37. Id. at 81, 139-40.
38. Id. at 36, 44, 56.
39. For example, both the broadcasting and print medias make use of public property-the
airwaves for broadcasters and the streets and sidewalks to deliver newspapers and magazines; too
few people have the resources to be able to express themselves through either media; and both
media have few outlets. Id. at 90, 93-94.
40. Id. at 109.
41. Id. at xi-xii.
42. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., American Broadcasting and the First Amendment (U. of Cal., 1987).
For other works by Powe on the First Amendment, see Or of the [Broadcast] Press, 55 Tex. L.
Rev. 39 (1976); Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 S. Ct. Rev. 243; Thomas G.
Krattenmaker and Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity
and an Impossible Dream, 1985 Duke L. J. 151.
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dom of the press-points in favor of an autonomous print media. He
expresses full agreement, for example, with two of his colleagues, David
Anderson and David Rabban, whose work, he claims, demonstrates that
the framers of the First Amendment intended to prohibit both prior
restraints of the press and seditious libel laws.43 Powe reserves his high-
est praise for the Court's landmark rulings in Sullivan, which "pro-
tected falsity to protect truth" 4 and The Pentagon Papers Case,
45
which "protected truth to expose official lies."
46
Part II of Powe's book explores several contentious areas of debate
over the freedom of the press-libel, prior restraints, and antitrust-in
order to expose the practical impossibilities of devising regulations of
the press that do not undermine the press's constitutional role as a
watchdog on governmental abuses.47 Powe admits, however, that the
press's need to obtain access to information has been satisfactorily ful-
filled by statutes, such as shield laws, sunshine laws, and freedom of
information acts.4
In Part III Powe compares and contrasts two competing concep-
tions of the "public's right to know" under which either the press or the
government, but not both, should serve as the "public's surrogate" for
keeping the public informed and the government honest.49 Powe vigor-
ously defends a constitutionally guaranteed reportorial privilege to gov-
ernment-controlled information in order "[t]o guarantee added
information that will allow the public to better understand [social and
political issues, to] bring to the public information which they could not
otherwise acquire[, to] guarantee that the press cannot be intimidated
by government[, and to] remove the chilling effect [of governmental
control of information] on public discussions.''10
Unlike Bollinger and Powe, Smolla focuses on the freedom of
43. See Powe, The Fourth Estate at 20 (cited in note 9). For contrasting views on the history
of the First Amendment, see, for example, Zachariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States
18-20 (Harvard, 1941); Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (Oxford, 1985); William
Mayton, From a Legacy of Suppression to the "Metaphor of the Fourth Estate," 39 Stan. L. Rev.
139 (1986); David Rabban, An Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in
Early American History, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 795 (1985); William Mayton, Seditious Libel and the
Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 91, 95, 97, 117-20 (1984).
44. Powe, The Fourth Estate at 104.
45. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
46. Powe, The Fourth Estate at 104.
47. Id. at 109.
48. In addition, Powe admits that he omits a discussion of privacy because "the legal (as
opposed to ethical) issues involved in discussing the private lives of elected officials are nonexis-
tent" and because he prefers to "leave the private lives of entertainers to the grocery store lines
and to others." Id.
49. Id. at 2:33.
50. Id. at 256-57.
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speech rather than the freedom of the press. In Free Speech in an
Open Society Smolla expands on his work as a premier chronicler and
critic of defamation law51 and as the director of the Annenburg Wash-
ington Program Libel Reform Project.52 His new book sets forth the
lasting lessons of the American experience with freedom of speech for
the purpose of passing them on to the public, including our youth, and
any countries interested in developing open societies similar to our own.
Smolla's book consists of three parts. Part I examines the theoreti-
cal and historical justifications for granting special status and protec-
tion to the freedom of speech. Smolla reviews various theories of free
speech, including the marketplace of ideas and the relationship between
free expression, human dignity, and democratic self-governance, and
discusses the methodologies for deriving these theories from the First
Amendment, including absolutism, historicism, and balancing.53 Smolla
concludes that all of these conventional approaches to the First Amend-
ment "miscarry as coherent general theories of free speech. '54 Conse-
quently, he proposes-in a manner similar to that of the prominent,
liberal First Amendment scholar, Professor Thomas Emerson 55-that a
"comprehensive theory" or "coherent approach to the future of free
speech" requires judges to ensure that speech regulations satisfy all of
the rationales for free speech and free press.56 This approach requires
several steps, the most important of which is the promulgation of
"[r]ules ... to govern the regulation of the content of speech in the
general marketplace, '57 which, in turn, requires development of "rules
tilted heavily in favor of free expression. '58 These rules compel in yet
another step the development of various principles for protecting free
51. See, for example, Rodney A. Smolla, Jerry Falwell v. Larry Flynt: The First Amendment
on Trial (St. Martin's, 1988); Rodney A. Smolla, Suing the Press: Libel, the Media, and Power
(Oxford, 1986); Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation (Clark Boardman Co., 1986); see also Rod-
ney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1984).
52. See Proposal for the Reform of Libel Law: The Report of the Libel Reform Project of the
Annenberg Washington Program (R. Smolla, Project Director, 1988) ("Anneberg Proposal"). See
also Powe, The Fourth Estate at 132 (cited in note 9) (critiquing the proposal).
53. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 6-42 (cited in note 10).
54. Id. at 42.
55. Emerson argued that judicial protection for freedom of speech was important to society
as a safety valve or outlet for protest and that courts should regard all of the theories of freedom of
speech and of the press as providing the full range of rationales on which they could rely in pro-
tecting the two interrelated constitutional guarantees. See generally Thomas I. Emerson, The Sys-
tem of Free Expression (Random House, 1970).
56. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 43.
57. Id.
58. Id. The other steps consist of the development of rules for governing the "noncontent
regulation of speech" and for the "regulation of speech in special settings removed from the gen-
eral marketplace." Id. at 43, 44.
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speech in the general marketplace."9
Part II of Smolla's book examines the ways in which the govern-
ment attempts to censor political speech. Using various reasons for pro-
tecting freedom of speech depending on the context, message, and
governmental interest, Smolla argues for constitutional protection of
symbolic dissent, such as flag-burning; dissent advocating violence un-
less the speech involved would demonstrably cause palpable harm to
persons or property; the publication of any newsworthy information
about public or private figures, including even the involuntary "outing"
of gay politicians,"0 but not private facts about private persons;6 ' hate
speech except "when it poses a clear and present danger of violence, or
is intertwined with actual discriminatory conduct; 6 2 and campaign
expenditures."'
59. Id. at 46-51 (discussing the "neutrality," "emotive," "symbolism," "harm," "causation"
and "precision" principles of freedom of speech).
60. Id. at 137. Smolla accepts Sullivan as a baseline. See id. at 118-19. His other works also
reflect his general approval of Sullivan. See, for example, Annenberg Proposal at 7 (cited in note
52) (suggesting Sullivan was a "success"); Daan Braveman, William C. Banks, and Rodney A.
Smolla, Constitutional Law: Structure and Rights in Our Federal System 1249 (Mathew Bender,
2d ed. 1991) (praising Sullivan for "captur[ing] the essence of the American constitutional experi-
ence: that dynamic and vigorous debate, conducted generation through generation, over what it
means to be American, to be committed to democracy, equality, tolerance, religious freedom, free-
dom of expression, and due process of law, to place our ultimate trust in 'a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open"').
61. After identifying the four conflicts between the freedom of the press and privacy val-
ues-newsworthy material and public figures, public figures and nonnewsworthy information, pri-
vate people and newsworthy material, and nonnewsworthy information and either public or private
figures-Smolla indicates that the only instance in which he would allow a cause of action for
defamation is nonnewsworthy information about private citizens. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open
Society at 124-27 (cited in note 10). The reason for this rather extreme position is that Smolla errs
on the side of bringing any arguably socially or politically relevant information to the public
marketplace.
62. Id. at 169. Acknowledging hate speech as "an abomination," id., Smolla considers how
statutes regulating hate speech are tailored. He suggests that "[tihe only prohibitions [of hate
speech] likely to be upheld are narrowly drawn restrictions on fighting words that present a clear
and present danger of violence, or that punish physical injury to persons or property, or illegal
discriminatory conduct, or that involve purely 'private' speech in a context completely removed
from discussion of issues of general or public concern." Id. at 167. He reviews the constitutionality
of the ordinance at issue in a case pending before the Supreme Court, In re R.A.V., No. C8-90-
1656, 59 U.S.L.W. 2453 (Minn. Sup. Ct., Jan. 18, 1991). This law provides that it is a misdemeanor
to place, "on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti,
including but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender." Id. Smolla concludes that this ordinance violates his precision principle, which
would have required the ordinance to "state that cross-burning creating a 'clear and present dan-
ger' of lawless action, or amounting to an 'incitement to lawless action,' is prohibited." Smolla,
Fret Speech in an Open Society at 168 (cited in note 10).
6:3. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 238-39. Yet another category of protected
speech, Smolla argues, is speech financed with public funds. Protection exists for this type of
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* In Part III, Smolla considers how developments in the technologies
of communication and publication can and should affect the future of
freedom of speech in this country and the rest of the world. He argues
that the advent of new technologies facilitating the free flow of informa-
tion (such as fax machines) may require the modification or abandon-
ment of old doctrines. For example, he suggests that the almost
instantaneous sharing of information between news bureaus makes
prior restraints of speech more problematic than ever before because
information can be passed on and published before an injunction could
take effect. 4 He argues further that new technologies are eliminating
barriers between the print and broadcast media, common carriers, and
cable companies, thus requiring the formulation of new doctrines to
guarantee the freedom of the press. 5 He urges government not to suc-
cumb to the temptation to overregulate speech for the sake of separat-
ing "substance from clutter" in its efforts to develop such doctrines.68
Smolla concludes by making various suggestions about how the
United States can become a more effective leader in shaping an interna-
tional marketplace of ideas.6 Although he recognizes that other coun-
tries may encounter problems in adapting our freedom of speech rules
to their special cultures,6 8 he believes that freedom of speech can flour-
ish internationally as long as other nations remain firmly committed to
"the faith that the free flow of information across international borders
avoids more wars than it causes, averts more terrorism than it feeds,
uncovers more violations of human rights than it incites." 69
IV. LIBERAL TRUST AND DISTRUST UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A central question on which liberals disagree is who society can
trust to protect effectively First Amendment values: the Supreme
Court, the state, the press, or the public. Bollinger tends to trust the
Supreme Court and the state but not the people or even the press to
promote the values embodied in the freedom of the press guarantee.
speech unless the government regulation is sufficiently neutral, precise, proportionate to the gov-
ernment's economic contribution, relevant to the mission of the government program dispensing
the benefits, acceptable to professionals in the field, viewpoint-neutral, and accommodating of ap-
plicable constitutional guarantees such as freedom of exercise of religion. See id. at 170-220.
64. Id. at 286-87.
65. See id. at 322.
66. Id. at 342.
67. For example, he suggests we could "make our own conduct consistent, so that our behav-
ior toward speech in our foreign relations is equivalent to our behavior toward the speech of our
own citizens." Id. at 347.
68. See, for example, id. at 353 (speculating that other countries are likely "to limit the neu-
trality principle to speech that does not attack values of ethnic and religious tolerance, or that in
some other way attempts to undermine the very existence of the social community").
69. Id. at 367.
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Powe trusts the Court, the press, and the people but harbors deep-
seated distrust of the state's capacity to take seriously freedom of the
press values. Smolla shares Powe's outlook on whom he can trust but in
the broader context of the freedom of speech rather than the freedom
of the press.
A. The Supreme Court
For the most part, Bollinger, Powe, and Smolla take conventionally
liberal positions on how the Court should answer First Amendment
questions. The specific methods each proposes for judicial interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment reflect how much each trusts the Court.
Bollinger believes that the Court has two important powers in the
context of the freedom of the press. First, it can "shap[e] society's ideas
about itself and hence its character" by "articulating a vision and com-
menting on the nature of society."70 Second, it has the power to influ-
ence press behavior because the press depends on the Court for its
freedom from intervention and the Court can influence public opinion
about the press.71
The substantial degree to which Bollinger is willing to trust the
Court not to abuse these powers is evident in his failure to defend the
method he believes the Court should use to shape empirically sound
images of society and of the press.72 He merely assumes that the Court
will do a good job of balancing competing interests to decide freedom of
the press cases.73 Bollinger repeatedly critiques the Court's decisions on
the freedom of the press strictly in terms of the accuracy of its assess-
ment of costs and benefits.74 He suggests that regulation should be per-
mitted only when "overwhelming" competing interests point in favor of
70. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 42 (cited in note 8).
71. See id. at 49.
72. Although Bollinger argues, for example, that it is "crucial that courts begin to develop a
more realistic set of images than that incorporating a regime of seditious libel," id. at 145, the only
suggestion Bollinger offers for how the Court can achieve this objective is a general reference to the
need to measure accurately the costs and benefits of different regulatory measures. See, for exam-
ple, id. at 48.
73. See, for example, id. at 22-23, 26.
74. See, for example, id. at 35-38 (discussing the social harm produced by the proliferation of
falsehoods and injurious statements); id. at 114 (examining the costs and benefits of partial regula-
tion to assess its workability and real value to society); id. at 131 (critiquing Powe's broadcast
analysis for failing to assess the costs and benefits of broadcast regulation); id. at 111, 146-47
(analyzing how the Court could balance competing interests related to a newsgathering right of
access to government-produced information). He rejects the autonomous view of the press on the
ground that the Court has failed properly to assess the social costs resulting from a misconception
of the press, including the harm to the public's psyche caused by the proliferation of falsehoods.
See id. at 26, 150.
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regulating to ensure "free and open debate."75
Bollinger achieves something truly remarkable by never explaining
the Court's authority or competence to balance competing interests in
the First Amendment context. Despite Powe's contention that "no book
about freedom of the press could ignore the framing of the First
[Amendment,]" '76 Bollinger has managed to write a book on the free-
dom of the press without any serious discussion of the text, history, or
structure of the First Amendment.
77
Even though Bollinger has elsewhere defended the Court's author-
ity and capacity for balancing competing interests, 78 it is odd that he
does not bother to do so in his new book, which represents his most
ambitious enterprise yet on the freedom of the press. He could, but
does not, justify his approach on the grounds that, as Smolla acknowl-
edges, the history of the First Amendment is ambiguous and unhelpful
in resolving current issues,79 that taking the text at face value when it
seemingly speaks in categorical terms might lead to absurd results, and
that the Court's approach in this area has traditionally consisted of bal-
ancing competing interests.8 0
In addition to his failure to cite any authority for the propriety of
balancing interests in First Amendment cases or to show the superiority
of balancing over other methods of interpreting the First Amendment,
Bollinger's faith in the Court's balancing runs into two problems that
Smolla identifies: Balancing "fails to recognize the powerful justifica-
tions for freedom of speech [and of the press] and fails to curb the re-
curring impulses that motivate antispeech legislation."8 ' First, Bollinger
often undervalues the textual commitment to the freedom of the press.
For example, although the text of the Constitution clearly places a pre-
mium on the freedom of the press whenever government acts, Bollinger
refers variously to freedom of the press as an "interest," a "value," and
a "right."8 2 These references reflect Bollinger's tendency to give differ-
75. Id. at 133.
76. Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 19 (cited in note 9).
77. Bollinger does, however, briefly discuss the relevance of Peter Zenger and the Sedition
Act of 1798 to the contemporary understanding of the First Amendment. See Bollinger, Images of
a Free Press at 5-6 (cited in note 8).
78. See, for example, Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (cited in note 29).
79. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 33 (cited in note 10).
80. See Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a Gen-
eral Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1212, 1251-55 (1983).
81. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 42.
82. See, for example, Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 10 (cited in note 8) (referring to
the First Amendment's "interest" in uninhibited debate about public issues and the state's "inter-
est" in protecting individual reputations); id. at 58 (referring to the "deep and rich debate over the
question whether rights exist to serve the public good or for some other reason"); id. at 116 (refer-
ring to the Court's "impos[ition of] a compromise [based] on a reasoned, principled, accommoda-
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ent weight to the freedom of the press depending on the context. Such
discourse is typical of Bollinger's book and leaves one with cloudy im-
pressions of what he thinks the freedom of the press entails and of how
his thinking is grounded, if at all, in the text, history, and structure of
the Constitution.
Second, Bollinger's balancing often seems weighted toward govern-
mental regulation of the press. His manipulation is subtle, constant,
and effective: he acknowledges that Sullivan was based on a vision that
the marketplace of ideas is important for the search for truth and for
the preservation of democracy, but he equates this "central image"
sometimes with the promotion of the truth and other times with the
fostering of democracy. 3 Grounding protection of the press on only one
of the rationales underlying Sullivan-securing democratic govern-
ment-permits greater regulation because as long as the press is not
engaged in political speech it can make no serious claim to outweigh the
government's interest. If Bollinger truly accepted that we need the
press to facilitate the search for truth as well as to secure democratic
government, he would make it more difficult to regulate the press be-
cause truth requires a greater proliferation and dissemination of infor-
mation than mere political discourse. 4
Unlike Bollinger, Powe and Smolla consider the text, history, and
structure of the First Amendment, leading each of them to envision a
pivotal role for the Court in holding unconstitutional regulations of
speech and the press that do not satisfy all of the rationales underlying
the First Amendment.8 Both Powe and Smolla would grant the Court
tion of competing First Amendment values").
83. See, for example, id. at 44 (suggesting that the press is a necessary precondition of a
working democracy); id. at 73 (equating the marketplace of ideas concept with truth); id. at 110
(equating the marketplace of ideas with democracy).
84. Indeed, the marketplace of ideas was actually based on a conception that the dissemina-
tion of information was important for the search for truth, a conception that makes regulation
more difficult because it is not strictly limited to political speech. See generally David M. Rabban,
The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1205 (1983).
For a general critique of interest balancing in First Amendment cases, see Smolla, Free
Speech in an Open Society at 39-42 (cited in note 10). Smolla's critique makes me wonder how
Bollinger would argue a freedom of the press case before the Supreme Court: would he ever make
reference to the text, history, or structure of the Constitution in trying to persuade the Court to
reach his desired result? Bollinger never discusses the relevance of these traditional sources of
constitutional decisionmaking to adjudication of First Amendment questions. Thus, his balancing
leads him to sidestep some of the perennial questions in constitutional law about the scope and the
history of the freedom of the press in this country, including whether the framers intended to
incorporate the Blackstonian notion of freedom of the press as meaning only freedom from prior
restraints or a broader view, proscribing seditious libel laws.
85. Compare note 84; Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 251 (cited in note 9)
(suggesting that the constitutionality of a regulation of the press depends on whether it infringes
"the whole range of interests that the First Amendment protects"). Both Powe and Smolla are in
good liberal company in asserting that every regulation of speech or of the press must satisfy the
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considerable power-to use a strong, sometimes irrebuttable presump-
tion of unconstitutionality of government regulation of the freedom of
speech and of the press-for the sake of protecting the press (in Powe's
case) and the press and unpopular speakers (in Smolla's case) from a
hostile state.86 Their common presumption derives from Smolla's devel-
opment of complex rules that have the invariable effect of striking
down speech regulations87 and from Powe's endorsement of the Legal
Longhorns' First Amendment, that is, his resolution of almost every
major dispute about the scope of the freedom of the press in terms of
the scholarship of his colleagues at the University of Texas Law
School.88 To the extent that Powe and Smolla pull the arguments that
various interests underlying the First Amendment. Professor Steven Shiffrin of Cornell Law
School explains that freedom of speech is supported by a multiplicity of values, including "individ-
ual self-expression, social communion, political participation, the search for truth and for informed
choice, social catharsis, the social affirmation of the rights of equality, dignity, and respect, and the
freedom from arbitrary, official aggrandizing or excessively intrusive government regulation."
Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 1103, 1197-98
(1983). Similarly, Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School has suggested that an adequate
conception of freedom of speech must draw upon "several strands of theory in order to protect a
rich variety of expressional modes." Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 579 (1st ed.
1978). See also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 16-25
(Random House, 1966).
86. Whereas Bollinger's balancing enables him to speak of a "hierachy of speech," Bollinger,
Images of a Free Press at 47 (cited in note 8), Smolla's strong presumption in favor of expression
allows him to discuss a "hierarchy of governmental justifications" under which speech on public
issues is routinely given a high value but the government's interests vary in importance. Smolla,
Free Speech in an Open Society at 50 (cited in note 10). Bollinger does not indicate, however, the
extent to which he agrees with the Court's current hierarchy of speech or whether his balancing of
competing interests would lead him to reach some different ordering of speech. Compare Bollinger,
Images of a Free Press at 140-41 (apparently agreeing with Alexander Meikeljohn that the First
Amendment primarily protects political speech)
87. See, for example, notes 57, 58, 60, and 62.
88. Throughout his book, Powe repeatedly endorses different colleagues' scholarship on the
First Amendment. First, he applauds David Anderson's and David Rabban's historical research on
the First Amendment. See note 43 and accompanying text. Second, Powe agrees with Rabban's
historical analysis of Justice Holmes' influential dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
624 (1919), claiming that Holmes' argument that the First Amendment protected unpopular ex-
pression to ensure a marketplace of ideas rested on the concept that a marketplace of ideas was
critical for facilitating society's search for the truth. Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitu-
tion at 69 (cited in note 9). Third, Powe agrees with Rabban's argument that the Espionage Act of
1917 symbolized congressional efforts to balance censorship desires and to identify worthwhile po-
litical speech. Id. at 69. Fourth, the only libel reform proposal for which Powe expresses full ap-
proval is that of David Anderson, who would require "plaintiffs to prove actual damages (allowing
dignity awards only when economic injury is proven-a possible loophole that could run up dam-
ages), but takes away their need to prove actual malice." Id. at 135. Fifth, Powe accepts Sanford
Levinson's "trenchant point" that the consolidation of wealth requires the Court to support regu-
lation of campaign finance and expenditures. Id. at 250. Sixth, Powe endorses University of Texas
Law School Dean Mark Yudof's distrust of state involvement in regulating the freedom of speech
and the press on the ground that "with all its resources and prestige, government has a powerful
incentive to influence public debate in ways that favor those currently holding power." Id. at 254.
Lastly, Powe agrees with Jack Balkin that the "universal love of freedom of expression" no longer
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support the results they would like to see-such as a virtually autono-
mous print media-out of different sources, they may actually be em-
ploying a balancing test because they are implicitly making judgments
about the appropriate weight -to attach to each of the factors they con-
sider."' Moreover, in giving the Court substantial discretion to deter-
mine the constitutionality of a regulation of speech or of the press,
Powe and Smolla appear willing to run the risk of substituting one ty-
rant-the Court-for another tyrant-the legislature. The danger of
this approach is that the Court may not be competent to appreciate
fully or to enforce all of the different rationales underlying the First
Amendment. Moreover, the Court may lack the requisite authority to
perform the tasks that Powe and Smolla assign to it. For example, if, as
Smolla concedes, the text, history, and structure of the First Amend-
ment do not point to clear constitutional principles of freedom of
speech,"' where exactly is Smolla looking when he defines the contours
of his "comprehensive" and "coherent" theory of freedom of speech?
Although he argues that we need such a theory to provide rules that the
courts can sensibly apply to resolve disputes in the context of freedom
of speech, his concession that many of the conventional sources of con-
stitutional decisionmaking are indeterminate undermines his repeatedly
stated preference for resolving ambiguity in favor of uninhibited speech
and conflicts with Powe's reading of the same sources. 91 If none of the
exists. Id. at 290.
89. For example, Powe, like Bollinger, accepts Sullivan's rationale as promoting both the
search for truth and democracy. Powe believes any regulation of the freedom of the press must
satisfy both rationales, id. at 104-05, but Bollinger proceeds as if a regulation can be reviewed
under either one. See notes 82-83 and accompanying text. Similarly, by making reference to all of
the rationales for protecting freedom of speech and of the press, Smolla may be stacking the deck.
For example, he acknowledges that "[i]f freedom of speech is to be authentically embraced as a
value of transcendent importance," he must devise "rules tilted heavily in favor of free expres-
sion." Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 43 (cited in note 10). In addition, as Smolla gets
further away from the core kind of speech protected by the First Amendment, he seems to find
balancing more convenient. He suggests that the tort of unauthorized appropriation of someone's
name or likeness for commercial purposes should not bar the use of a famous person's photograph
to help sell a magazine or newspaper featuring a story about that person. Smolla refers to the need
to "adjus[t] th[e] balance to permit this 'secondary exploitation'" and recognizes that the balance
he suggests "deliberately subsidizes speech." Id. at 144.
90. See Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 43.
91. See note 42 and accompanying text. The ultimate authority for Smolla's preference to
provide substantial protection to political dissent seems to be his recognition that, in "charting the
future of free speech . . . [one must] strike the appropriate balance between . . . two irrepressible
philosophical impulses"-classical republicanism and "a libertarian streak"-that influenced the
drafting of the Constitution. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 72 (cited in note 10).
Although Smolla strikes this balance in favor of the free exercise of individual rights, id. at 95, this
balance is undercut by his criticism that balancing does not adequately protect the core values
embodied in the First Amendment. See note 81. Moreover, he has claimed that the history of the
First Amendment itself is ill-defined. See note 79. In short, Smolla leaves unclear precisely how
republicanism and libertarianism influenced the First Amendment's drafting and why they must
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conventional sources of constitutional interpretation clearly authorize a
widespread judicial hostility to regulations of speech and of the press,
then Smolla cannot claim constitutional authority for giving the Court
the power he wants it to have.92 Indeed, much of the impetus for the
approaches of both Powe and Smolla to the First Amendment turns on
their deep-seated distrust of the state, which is the subject of the next
section.
B. The State
Bollinger trusts the state far more than either Powe or Smolla do.
Bollinger's faith in the state turns on two interrelated principles. First,
he suggests that "the market for freedom of the press necessarily exists
within the larger context of a market for goods and services. This
means that citizens arrive at the system of press freedom with vast ine-
qualities of wealth and, thus, with very different abilities to participate
effectively in public debate. '93 Therefore, the state may have a respon-
sibility to prevent these inequities from distorting public debate.
Second, Bollinger suggests that the real concern with the market-
place of ideas is with power-that is, the "ability to command an audi-
ence more or less exclusively"-and that this concern is "undiminished
by the means by which such power is achieved." 4 Bollinger agrees with
Professor Owen Fiss that the state necessarily has a role in the market-
place of ideas, at least to protect speakers from private interference.95
and how they can be balanced to produce certain results in the First Amendment context. For a
discussion of why these two traditions do not need to be balanced in constitutional adjudication,
see Michael J. Gerhardt, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 393, 404-
07 (1988) (reviewing Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional
Law (Harvard, 1988)) (suggesting that, as a historical matter, the liberal tradition was far more
influential in the drafting of the Constitution than the republican tradition).
92. Ironically, distrust of the Court could lead someone to give the Court even more power
than Powe and Smolla give it. Some conservatives argue, for example, that the Court needs to be
given clear principles that can easily be applied to avoid unprincipled judicial interference with the
legitimate business of the elected branches of government. They argue further that even an absolu.
tist approach such as Justice Black's is defensible because it gives the Court a principle that is
clear, easily applied, and grounded in the categorical language of the First Amendment, and there-
fore not susceptible to abuse. Although such a bright-line rule would produce many of the results
Powe and Smolla would like to see in the context of the freedom of speech and of the press, it
exists to preclude judicial abuse.
93. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 137 (cited in note 8).
94. Id. at 138. Bollinger contrasts his view with that of Professor Owen Fiss, who argues that
the real problem with the marketplace of ideas is "market reach," Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?,
100 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 788 (1987), which refers to the conflict between the interests of those who
manage for-profit media institutions and the interests of the democratic society in ensuring that
citizens are supplied the information and ideas they ought to have. Bollinger, Images of a Free
Press at 137.
95. See Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 142. As this quote indicates, Bollinger sometimes
uses the term "state" to refer to government in general, including the courts.
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Moreover, Bollinger contends that there is no guarantee that the pri-
vate owners of print or broadcasting outlets will be concerned about the
First Amendment; rather, he suspects that they care more about their
pocketbooks than the freedom of the press."'
Bollinger argues that the state is in the best position to eliminate
the distortions that the unequal distribition of power and wealth have
wrought in the marketplace of ideas. Not only can the state break up
consolidated ownership of the outlets of communication and thereby
encourage greater diversity of viewpoints, but the state can draft legis-
lation that will improve the quality of public debate. In this respect,
Bollinger resembles Zachariah Chafee;97 they both argue that unless the
state endeavors to create a level playing field for public debate, the
wealthy and politically powerful pockets of society will dominate or mo-
nopolize political dialogue.
Bollinger's trust in the state allows him to overlook a serious prob-
lem with empirical support for his claims that broadcast regulation has
been successful and that regulation of all media is needed. His claim
that broadcast regulation works does not rest on empirical fact but
rather on the symbolic value of partial regulation's "compromise" be-
tween the values of "access in a highly concentrated press and minimal
government intervention."98 This is begging the question; partial regu-
lation cannot be a success because it is a "compromise." The question is
whether the "compromise" is a success. Similarly, Bollinger praises the
fairness doctrine because he finds that it ultimately is no worse than
any other First Amendment doctrine.9 9 But neither this justification for
96. See id. at 139.
97. See note 21 and accompanying text. Chafee was also a member of a blue-ribbon commis-
sion, which authored a prominent report on the freedom of the press in 1947. See Commission on
Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press (University of Chicago, 1947). The report
expressed concern over the facts that "the development of the press as an instrument of mass
communication has greatly decreased the proportion of the people who can express their opinions
and ideas through the press," that the press had thus far failed to meet the societal needs that a
free press should fulfill, and that the people "who direct the machinery of the press have engaged
from time to time in practices which the society condemns and which, if continued, it will inevita-
bly undertake to regulate or control." Id. at 1. The commission's solutions were to provide or
encourage greater education about the condition of the freedom of the press, to allow self-regula-
tion for the time being, and to call for the establishment of a privately funded institution that
would monitor and report on the press. Id. at 92-100. The lasting influence of the report is re-
flected in Bollinger's assessment that it provides "as good a statement as we have of why the press
is so important for the quality of our political system and why its freedom may be in jeopardy due
to its inadequacies and abuses." Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 28 (cited in note 8).
98. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 116.
99. See id. at 123 (stating that "the fairness doctrine is no more open-ended, no more vulner-
able to unprincipled, 'subjective' decisions, and no more dependent on the development of a hier-




the fairness doctrine nor his justification for accepting partial regula-
tion is a sufficiently important governmental interest to uphold regula-
tion of the press under Bollinger's own standard.' °° If Bollinger's
empirical research can provide no stronger evidence for partial regula-
tion, then partial regulation rests on a relatively weak foundation.
For all of Bollinger's talk about the need for more empirical re-
search on the successes of the broadcasting experience, he does not cite
a single instance in which broadcast regulation has actually resulted in
better public debate than that which the print media already provides.
Nor does he show that broadcasting would have produced poorer public
debate without governmental interference than it has done under cur-
rent regulations.
Ultimately, Bollinger is on a hopeless quest: He aims to figure out
how a majoritarian institution-the state-can enforce a countermajori-
tarian notion-the freedom of the press. 1'0 Yet, despite his emphasis on
the need for empirical research on the psychology of people to deter-
mine whether we need the state to protect us from reporting that dis-
torts or manipulates, 102 he never discusses the need for a psychology of
elected officials to determine how well they can process information in
order to draft laws that adequately protect the freedom of the press.
Nor does he develop a psychology of Supreme Court justices to deter-
mine how well they can balance competing interests.
Whereas Bollinger is willing to give the state a chance to regulate
the press to improve public debate, Powe does not trust the state to
protect freedom of the press. Powe finds two major problems with the
arguments of Fiss and Fiss's intellectual ally, Judith Lichtenberg,'
0 3
that the state should regulate the marketplace of ideas in order to per-
mit a diversity of voices and a level playing field for public debate.
First, Powe dismisses their argument that the marketplace of ideas "is a
fit candidate for government countervailing power . . . [to eliminate]
the distortions created by 'grossly unequal distributions of power.' ,,104
According to Powe, they advocate a "monistic First Amendment theory
[which] is inherently weak and undervalues the whole range of interests
that the First Amendment protects. .... [They] isolate a single strand
100. Compare note 74 and accompanying text.
101. This dilemma may be part of what Professor Charles Lindblom refers to as the "prob-
lem of circularity," Fiss, 100 Harv. L. Rev. at 791 (cited in note 94) (quoting Charles Edward
Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems 201-21 (Basic Books,
1977)). Fiss's solution to this problem is much like Bollinger's: They both insist that fear of the
state must be grounded in empirical evidence, not irrational distrust.
102. See notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
103. See Judith Lichtenberg, Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press, 16 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 329 (1987).
104. Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 250 (cited in note 9).
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of First Amendment justification [that is, the marketplace of ideas] and
attack it separately, as if there were nothing else on the field." 10 5
Second, Powe challenges the validity of Fiss's contention that even
if government regulation of the marketplace of ideas did not work, the
country would be no worse off because nothing else works the way it
should, either.'06 Sounding for a moment like Bollinger, Powe suggests
that Fiss should "'look facts in the face.' ",107 Powe's own empirical re-
search leads him to agree with Bollinger that the scarcity rationale does
not make sense because it is common for a community to have only one
daily newspaper but several television and radio stations and a multi-
channel cable system.'08 Powe also concurs with Bollinger that wealthy
people can monopolize any kind of medium.10'9
Powe and Bollinger depart company, of course, in their respective
readings of how well the state has done as a regulator of the media.
Powe's conclusion is unambiguous: "[t]he broadcast experience with a
regulated First Amendment offers the best evidence that a free press
must be an autonomous press." 1 0 But where Powe finds abuse, Bollin-
ger finds success. Bollinger criticizes Powe's earlier book in which Powe
argued that broadcast regulation has not worked because it has pro-
duced too many abuses. Among the abuses Powe enumerated in that
book are the government's propensity to drive from the airwaves some
radical voices within the broadcast media, the practice of handing out
television licenses in the 1950s as political rewards, and the tendency of
105. Id. at 251-52. This criticism applies equally to Bollinger's approach to the First Amend-
ment. See notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
106. See Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 254 (cited in note 9).
107. Id. at 254 (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 207. Like Bollinger and Powe, Smolla argues that "it is important to keep straight
what ,prectrum scarcity, assuming it exists, will and will not justify." Smolla, Free Speech in an
Open Society at 326 (cited in note 10). Otherwise, Smolla describes but does not critique the
system of partial regulation. See id. at 321-24.
109. See Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 211. Moreover, Bollinger argues
that because there is insufficient space to accommodate all those who would like to broadcast, and
without some system of allocation there would be chaos on the airwaves, the broadcasting industry
may require some sort of regulation. Bollinger does not believe, however, that "the only possible
method of allocation is through government licensing and regulation." Bollinger, Images of a Free
Press at 89 (cited in note 8). As Bollinger suggests, "[t]here are alternatives, the most important
being the system of private property rights and a market. . . . [Thus,] the question should be
whether there is any reason why-in public policy or First Amendment terms-we ought to prefer
a free market system over a government licensing-with-regulation system." Id. at 89. But if one
responds that government regulation of broadcasting is necessary because broadcasting uses a pub-
lic resource, this argument fails as a basis for partial regulation because "the print media also
makes use of public property-the streets and sidewalks upon which newspapers and magazines
are delivered." Id. at 90.
110. Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 294. He also observes that "in our
pluralistic society, private power over ideas and information is not monolithic. The power of the
federal government can be; that is why it may stifle if it wishes." Id. at 255.
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some Federal Communications Commissioners to curry political favor
in dealing with access issues."' Bollinger suggests that Powe's parade of
horribles may consist of isolated rather than repeated abuses. In Bollin-
ger's view, we need to distinguish between committing abuse and at-
tempting to commit abuse," 2 and we must determine how to change
regulations to eliminate the abuses that do occur and consider the ac-
tual costs and benefits of a given law."13 Ironically, Powe and Bollinger
cancel each other's research and leave the reader confused about how
well and whether the present system really works.
Nevertheless, Powe's distrust of the state is evident throughout his
new book. For example, although he begins his chapter on prior re-
straints by observing that "the changes in the law may well have moved
the 'no prior restraints' doctrine into functional obsolescence," 4 he ad-
mits that he shares the press's "reflex loathing of prior restraints.""15
More importantly, he fails to cite any instance in which he approves of
the use of a prior restraint, and argues that even publication of plans
for building a hydrogen bomb should not be enjoined because
"[information, even that which legal rules deem of no value, is essen-
tial to public debate and potential change. . . . The need to challenge
the status quo, and to do so on the citizen's rather than the govern-
ment's terms, provides a continuing reason for a special hostility to
prior restraints." '" 6
111. See Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 13-30, 112-17, and chapters 5, 8,
and 9 (cited in note 9).
112. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 130-32 (cited in note 8).
113. Id.
114. Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 141.
115. Id. at 167.
116. Id. at 169. Powe, however, makes at least two exceptions to his general distrust of the
state. First, he agrees with Bollinger, see Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 147-48 (claiming that
courts may underenforce' certain constitutional norms, particularly with respect to the
newsgathering right of the press), that we need more than the courts to protect the press's access
to important sources of information. Powe concedes that "other governmental officials have an
important duty to facilitate the acquisition of information by the press-as shield laws, sunshine
laws, and freedom of information acts recognize-and an equal duty on judges to broadly construe
legislative efforts to implement these inchoate rights." Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitu-
tion at 199.
Second, Powe expresses approval for an antitrust policy that is not unique to the media. Rec-
ognizing that outlets for diverse views are shrinking because of the increasing concentration of
newspaper ownership, id. at 226, Powe admits:
[T]he Constitution does not stand as a bar to prevent the polity from taking steps to reduce
concentration in the one industry most important to our well-being as a democracy. We
should recall, though, Chafee's reminder that if we rely on the antitrust laws, we must never-
theless be wary of too great an association between government and the industry.
Id. at 229. Even though he expresses approval for laws breaking up harmful concentrations of
power, id. at 221, and for the "application of general laws to the press," id. at 224, Powe feels that
antitrust legislation is "unlikely to prove effective in combating media concentration." Id. at 227.
1048
1992] BOOK REVIEW 1049
Like Powe, Smolla is most fearful of the government's tendency to
censor, particularly in times of crisis.11 After surveying the most fa-
mous cases involving political speech, Smolla concludes, for example,
that "[i]n virtually every freedom of speech case involving political dis-
sent that has ever reached the United States Supreme Court for resolu-
tion, no palpable harm ever in fact occurred. . . . It is not the
irrationality, passion, or paranoia of speakers that society should fear,
but of censors."P 8 Smolla finds plenty of other evidence to confirm his
fear of censorship, including the tendency of the government "to exag-
gerate national security threats and use the excuse to dissolve civil lib-
erties""19 and the Bush administration's restrictions on media access to
various sources of information during the Persian Gulf War. 20 Like
Powe,' 2 ' Smolla fears that courts are moving away from the position he
prefers: that "[p]rior restraints should be presumptively invalid, and
permitted only when the government meets the burden of proving, with
clear and convincing evidence, that imminent death or grave personal
injury will almost certainly occur if the restraint is not issued."' 22 In
117. See, for example, Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 41, 290 (cited in note 10).
In expressing their fear of governmental censorship in stressful times, Smolla and Powe echo Pro-
fessor Vincent Blasi. See, for example, Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 449, 449-50 (1985) (arguing that courts should adopt a "pathologi-
cal perspective[:] . . . IT]he overriding objective at all times should be to equip the first amend-
ment to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is
most prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent systemati-
cally.") Unlike Powe and Smolla, Blasi takes a relatively narrow view of how much speech the
First Amendment should protect. Id. at 476-80 (arguing for a "lean, trim" First Amendment in
order to withstand the stress of "pathological" periods in our history).
118. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 116.
119. Id. at 288.
120. Id. at 292. These rules included restrictions on publishing information pertaining to
strategy and other data that would help the enemy, limited access to troops and combat areas for
small pools of reporters, and rules requiring that in the event of a dispute between military officials
and a reporter the final decision on whether to release the information would rest with the
originating reporters' news organization. Smolla fears that such restrictions hinder the press's abil-
ity to inform the American people about the government's policies and activities during war,
thereby cutting at the heart of the First Amendment. He suggests that the Vietnam War proved
that the press can perform admirably in wartime without governmental interference. Id. at 299-
300. Nevertheless, he finds, recent presidents have refused to follow the Vietnam press model, as
President Reagan's restrictive media regulations during the Grenada invasion illustrate. Id. at 308.
121. Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 169 (cited in note 9).
122. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 281. Smolla criticizes the temporary re-
straining order issued by a federal judge in Miami to prevent the Cable News Network from airing
tapes containing telephone conversations between Manuel Noreiga and his attorneys. The Su-
preme Court ultimately rejected the press's request for an expedited review of the prior restraint
in that case. Although the trial judge eventually allowed full airing of the tapes, Smolla claims that
the trial court's restraint of publication was not supported by its claims that publication would
have impaired a fair trial and breached the attorney-client privilege. He suggests that the govern-
ment could have easily found jurors who had not heard of Noreiga, that the information on the
tapes had already been transmitted to and published by other media, and that the disclosures
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short, Smolla and Powe adopt the conventional liberal attitude that al-
lowing the state to regulate the press is akin to asking a fox to guard a
henhouse.
C. The Press
In recent years, liberals have split over the degree to which the
freedom of the press requires or, conversely, is undermined by an au-
tonomous press. Their disagreements turn on whether they believe the
press merits special status as a watchdog on government. Bollinger,
Powe, and Smolla take different positions on this issue: Bollinger dis-
trusts the press because of its tendency to act out of economic self-
interest rather than a desire to improve public debate; Powe, and
Smolla in a much briefer discussion, trust the press to effectively moni-
tor governmental abuse.
Bollinger argues that an autonomous press has not produced better
public debate. For example, he ends his book with a disturbing tale of a
reporter who took grisly photographs of the victims of a car wreck, re-
fused to follow a policeman's order to get out of the way of medical
personnel, and later asserted a First Amendment defense to a convic-
tion under a statute prohibiting persons from disobeying a reasonable
order from a police officer. 12 3 This story confirms Bollinger's opinion
that
[n]o one, including Supreme Court justices in their conferences, fully trusts the
public to put issues in their proper perspective or digest information fairly. And
having the press present may create opportunities for unproductive conflict-and
the public lies dying while both the public officials and the press avoid their dis-
tressing duties by engaging in heated argument with each other.
12
4
In response to this dilemma, Bollinger advocates the development of a
psychology of the First Amendment that will allow us "to face the truth
• . . that there are definite and substantial limits on our willingness to
trust the process of wide-open public debate with all information.' 2 5 In
Bollinger's view, the public cannot trust the press to provide the infor-
mation it needs, so the Court and the state are needed to regulate and
ensure that public debate is not debased.
In contrast, Powe makes a particularly forceful case for the auton-
omy of the press. 26 He argues that the freedom of the press empowers
might not have revealed information that could have prejudiced Noreiga's right to a fair trial. Id.
at 245. Nevertheless, Smolla suggests that the real harm may have been that the case led some
government officials to discount the harms of even temporary prior restraints. Id. at 250, 274.
123. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 149 (cited in note 8).
124. Id. at 150.
125. Id.
126. Unlike Powe, Smolla does not make an explicit case for an autonomous press. Instead,
he describes the Supreme Court's compromise under which it would not "permit the imposition of
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the press and that "[w]ith power goes responsibility, and the important
questions are whether an accounting will be called for and if so, who
will do it and by what means." '27 Ultimately, Powe's answer to these
important questions rests on his faith that an autonomous press is an
important check against government abuse.'"" He perceives an impor-
tant parallel between an autonomous press and judicial review: both
check governmental abuses, and both are considered crucial compo-
nents of democracy. '29 While Powe concedes that, "[1]ike judicial re-
view, freedom of the press has its good times and its bad times,"'130 he
argues that, on balance, the press has generally performed better than
judicial review, that it excelled during Watergate and The Pentagon
Papers Case, that it has never produced abominations such as Dred
Scott v. Sandford '3 and Plessy v. Ferguson,'32 and that even its fail-
ures have been reported by other journalists. Powe finds that "[ihe
tensions inherent in the checking function and majoritarian decision-
making ensure that the press, even as it serves its various functions, will
be challenged, sometimes from the right, sometimes from the left, and
maybe even sometimes by everyone. 1 3 3 For Powe, the public is the ulti-
mate check on the press.
D. The Public
Until recently, constitutional commentary rarely focused on the
public for whose benefit most constitutional guarantees exist. One sign
of changing times, however, is that liberals are beginning to think more
about the role of the people in public affairs. While Bollinger expresses
skepticism about the public's ability to know what is in its best interest,
Powe and Smolla stake the future of the freedom of the press on the
people's willingness to exercise their power in a democracy.
rights of access to the press [and in turn would not] grant to the press rights of access to the
government." Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 298 (cited in note 10). Smolla recognizes
that under this compromise the First Amendment grants the press no special status and that in-
stead "the actors in the marketplace remain atomistic, self-interested, and market-driven: the
press, the government, and all other private citizens are left to tug and pull against one another in
a free market, in which none may assert any special demands or claims on the others, short of
freedom from restraints." Id. Smolla adds that "[t]he recognition of special status, however, would
have placed a new connective tissue among these actors, in which certain crisscrossing fiduciary
duties exist. This would have the effect of decreasing the freedom of the various actors but in-
creasing the overall flow of information." Id. at 299.
127. Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 290 (cited in note 10).
128. Id. at 294.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 295.
131. 60 U.S. 393 (1856), cited in Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 296.
132. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), cited in Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 295.
133. Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 297 (footnote omitted).
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In Images of a Free Press, Bollinger argues that the state can im-
prove political debate only if it develops an accurate "psychology of
people. ' 13 Such a psychology is needed to determine how well people
process the information to which they are exposed and how the govern-
ment can influence the marketplace of ideas in order to shape the pub-
lic's images of the press. If people can adequately process the
information they receive in order to engage in highly qualitative politi-
cal debate, then no regulation is necessary. If people cannot process in-
formation well or if they develop unsound images because the press
slants news, however, regulation of the press may then be needed.135
Bollinger's vision of the public's psychology runs into two serious
problems. First, although he criticizes others for constructing theories
on freedom of the press without empirical support, his description of
the psychology of the people does not rest on any empirical support.
Bollinger believes but does not prove that without governmental regula-
tion people would not naturally prefer high quality public debate:
[E]ven in a world in which the press is entirely free and open to all voices, with a
perfect market in that sense, human nature would still see to it that quality public
debate and decision making would not rise naturally to the surface but would, in all
probability, need the buoyant support of some form of collective action by citizens,
involving public institutions."'
Thus, he asserts, we need the state to protect us from our own natural
lack of "interest[] in informing ourselves about public issues, [because
we tend to] prefer[] entertainment and pleasure to the responsibilities
of citizenship.
1 37
Bollinger's picture of popular psychology raises a paradox he never
addresses: If we cannot trust ourselves and therefore must trust govern-
ment to protect us from our natural tendencies to be intellectually lazy
and easily distracted from serious public questions, then how can we
know when the government is deceiving us? The only real check on leg-
islative power under Bollinger's vision is provided by the public, whom
he distrusts; the press, whom he also distrusts; or the federal courts,
which he has criticized as the source of our flawed central image of the
press.13 Nor does Bollinger ever give the press credit for being an effec-
134. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 81 (cited in note 8). Bollinger makes clear that one
reason we need an empirically sound psychology of the people is that Sullivan confusingly "offered
two competing images [of the people]-the image of citizens reluctant to enter politics, and the
image of them as uncontrollably aggressive when they do engage in political debate." Id. at 35.
135. Id. at 123.
136. Id. at 139.
137. Id.
138. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text. Moreover, Bollinger does not consider the pos-
sibility (more real than not) that an Executive will appoint federal judges who tend to sympathize
with the administration's political agenda.
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tive watchdog for governmental abuse. In short, he seems to ignore Jus-
tice Brandeis's warning that "[e]xperience should teach us to be most
on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are
beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of
their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding. 1139
Second, the vision of people's psychology depicted in Bollinger's
new book seems to be at odds with his view of the public in The Toler-
ant Society.' 40 In a recent article, he explains that the thesis of the
book is that "the practice of toleration of verbal acts under free speech
may help inculcate what I call the tolerance ethic."'' The kind of per-
son Bollinger envisions when he discusses social tolerance is someone
who is open to new ideas yet smart enough not to be distracted or per-
suaded by hate speech.142 Yet the public Bollinger depicts in Images of
a Free Press is a different sort, prone to hateful speech, easily confused
or swayed by distorted information, and determined not to think for
themselves. 143 Bollinger could but does not resolve these conflicting
images by arguing that the state can regulate the media to provide for
the proliferation of information that would allow people to become bet-
ter informed about social and political matters and more capable of re-
acting to hate speech in the kind of tolerant fashion Bollinger envisions.
Instead, Bollinger leaves us with an image of intolerant or indifferent
people who nevertheless have some undefined capacity to appreciate
tolerance as a social and political value and government regulation of
139. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis dissenting). Justice
Frankfurter expressed a similar sentiment but in a different context: "[tihe accretion of dangerous
power does not come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of un-
checked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of author-
ity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952)
(Frankfurter concurring).
140. Compare Bollinger, The Tolerant Society at 82-83, 86, 140-41, 152-53, 238-40 (cited in
note 29).
141. Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 979,
984 (1990).
142. Bollinger suggests that "[a] person who feels healthy self-doubt toward her beliefs is a
person who is not just prone to let more speech go uncensored, but a person who is going to behave
differently, to insist on less and to compromise more, in the give-and-take of the political process."
Id. at 985.
143. According to Bollinger,
[w]e may wish to avoid the opinions of those with whom we disagree, especially those on the
margins of public debate, the radical voices. As a result, there may be a diaspora of view-
points and an unheeding of troubled or troubling voices. We may not think clearly about
some aspects of public issues. . . . We may have irrational prejudices against particular
groups or individuals within society. Or we may be unduly influenced, and have our judgment
distorted, by particular kinds of information in specific contexts.
Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 139-40 (cited in note 8).
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the media as capable of providing the kind of information they need to
make effective social and political choices.
144
Unlike Bollinger, Powe and Smolla trust the public more than they
trust the state even though both authors fail to address at length how
the people should go about protecting the freedom of the press. For
example, Powe refers approvingly to jury nullifications of many of the
government's efforts to convict for seditious libel,145 but he makes only
brief references to the American people's need to develop the good
sense and knowledge necessary to monitor the press. 46
Smolla, like Bollinger, envisions a connection between the Court's
enforcement of First Amendment values and the inculcation of those
values in the government and the people. He also perceives the federal
courts' hostility to prior restraints as one factor helping to instill a
''constitutional habit of mind" in governmental actors against the use of
prior restraints. 4 ' He goes even further, urging people to teach their
children about the virtues of an autonomous press, the kinds of publica-
tions they should avoid, and the importance of ensuring that regula-
tions of speech and of the press comply with all the rationales




Both Powe and Smolla go beyond Bollinger's "paternalism"' 4 9 and
the liberalism of the 1960s that put its faith in the Court as the primary
guarantor of the freedom of the press from the hostile state. Perceiving
144. It is also possible that the different images of people expressed in Bollinger's two books
are a byproduct of putting more weight on the social harm resulting from private defamation than
on the social harm resulting from group defamation or putting less weight on the public interest in
regulating hate speech than on the social need for greater regulation of defamatory speech of pub-
lic figures. My guess is that Bollinger believes that hate speech is part of the core of the political
speech that the First Amendment should protect, while falsehoods spread by the press do not
always rise to that level. Yet, even if one concedes the latter point, it could still follow that the
social harm caused by hate speech outweighs the collective harm to society that Sullivan may have
caused. In any event, balancing seems to be an unappealing and inconclusive method with which to
resolve these tensions.
145. Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 15, 72 (cited in note 9).
146. For example, he cites jury nullification as one reason for the demise of the Sedition Act
of 1798, id. at 13-15 and 35-36, but he does not mention that the law had a built-in expiration date
and that the law lost political impetus. In addition, even though Powe suggests that "[tihere is
more of a constitutional dimension to the general claim [for a newsgathering right] than judges can
competently enforce[,]" id. at 199, he agrees with the Court that "[s]pecially tailored decisions,
reflecting both the needs of a free press and the legitimate need to have access to a reporter's
information, will serve both the press and public by allowing a reporter to respect confidences in
the vast majority of circumstances." Id. at 190.
147. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 288 (cited in note 10).
148. Id. at 324, 333-35.
149. But see Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 144 (cited in note 8) (stating that "[ilt is
not paternalism when a majority of a society recognizes that its own intellectual limitations call for
some institutional or structural correctives. When regulation stems from self-conscious awareness
of biases, you do not have paternalism").
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that the Court is no longer likely to protect the press as vigorously as it
did in the 1960s, Smolla and Powe urge the American people to take a
more vigilant role in protecting the press from the state. Thus, they aim
to give fuel to efforts of the government and educators to inculcate in
the people the value of a mostly, if not fully, free press.
One can envision a psychology of the people that puts more faith
than Bollinger does in the intellectual capacity of the populace to dis-
tinguish politically useful matter from sensationalist material. As
Smolla observes, although people were initially hostile to the Supreme
Court's decisions providing First Amendment protection for flag-burn-
ing as unpopular political expression,' 50 they changed their minds and
accepted the principle that the First Amendment protects even expres-
sion that would desecrate it once the press had educated them about
the harms of amending the Constitution to overturn those decisions."'
It is to this kind of educative process that Powe and Smolla are
directing their arguments on the freedom of the press. They understand
that poor political discourse may result more from the quality of politi-
cal candidates debating public issues than from the press. Their solu-
tion is not to regulate the press but rather to encourage better and
more informed candidates to run for public office and to instill in the
people a sense of civic responsibility for learning about laws restricting
the freedom of the press and making known their displeasure with the
elected representatives supporting such laws. Ultimately, the future of
our freedoms depends on the willingness of the people to exercise their
rights with care and, in Powe's and Smolla's view, sensitivity to the
kind of society they are shaping. '52
150. See United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
151. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society at 93-95 (cited in note 10).
152. Professor West suggests that while "legal liberalism" may be on the decline and political
conservatism on the rise, those people concerned about the preservation of individual freedoms
and the increase in governmental discretion and regulation can learn from Czechoslovak President
Vaclav Havel's "'postdemocratic' political philosophy, [which] is grounded in an abiding commit-
ment to the individual, belief in the compatibility of individual freedom with social order, and
faith in the power of free individuals to create and protect a vibrant, diverse, pluralistic, and toler-
ant public life." West, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 46 (cited in note 7). She explains further that Havel's
liberalism "insists upon the possession of individual responsibility, rather than the possession of
individual rights, as both the necessary condition of a liberal regime and the best evidence of the
vitality of its guarantee of individual freedom" and "upon the importance of the civic and commu-
nitarian virtues of fraternity, compassion, fellow-feeling, solidarity, and sympathy to the mainte-
nance of a free, tolerant, and diverse public sphere." Id. at 46, 47. She also acknowledges that it
"ultimately depends upon the commitment and responsibility of individual citizens, not the writ-
ten guarantees of a constitution, to maintain the conditions for freedom." Id. at 47.
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V. CONSERVATIVE VISIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Ironically, the complex and intense liberal debate on the freedom
of speech and the press does not seem to have much of a corresponding
conservative tradition. Notable exceptions include Alexander
Meikeljohn,' 53 Lillian BeVier, I Robert Bork,' 51 and John Jeffries, 56 all
of whom have tended to trust the majoritarian process more than the
Supreme Court (except in a relatively narrow range of First Amend-
ment cases), to overlook the tensions within the system of partial regu-
lation,' 57 and to disfavor or distrust an autonomous press.15 8
153. Meiklejohn was perhaps the most prominent advocate in this century for the view that
the First Amendment protected only political speech. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and
Its Relation to Self-Government (Harper, 1948). Near the end of his career, however, he retreated
from this position. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 S. Ct.
Rev. 245, 256 (broadening his theory to define protected speech as including "the range of human
communications from which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, [and] sensitivity to
human values: the capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot
should express").
154. See, for example, Lillian BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First
Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1045 (1985); Lillian BeVier, An In-
formed Public, An Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 482
(1980); Lillian BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Sub-
stance and Limits of Principle, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 299 (1978). President Bush recently nominated
Professor BeVier to a judgeship on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
making her only the second person with substantial academic experience regarding the First
Amendment named to the bench within the past decade. The other person was Robert Bork. See
note 155.
155. See, for example, Bork, The Tempting of America (cited in note 6); Robert Bork, Neu-
tral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1 (1971).
156. See, for example, John Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 Yale L. J. 409 (1982); see
also Thomas Jackson and John Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1979).
157. See Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 91 (cited in note 8). But see Bork, The Tempt-
ing of America at 335 (cited in note 6) (referring to two of his decisions as a federal court of
appeals judge "call[ing] on the Supreme Court to reexamine its position that the electronic media
may be constitutionally subjected to restrictions that cannot be applied to the print media because
of the [F]irst [A]mendment" and "deci[ding] that the restrictions, in [his] view wrongly, applied to
the electronic media did not apply to cable television"). Bork's latter view reflects a libertarian
strain among some conservatives, who oppose the regulation of not only the media but also other
businesses.
158. Two prominent First Amendment scholars who do not fit easily into either of the politi-
cal camps are Professors Fred Schauer and William Van Alstyne. For a sampling of Schauer's
works on the First Amendment, see Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge, 1982);
Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unravelling the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U. L. Rev. 685
(1978); The Law of Obscenity (Bureau of National Affairs, 1976); "Private" Speech and the "Pri-
vate" Forum: Givhan v. Western Line School District, 1979 S. Ct. Rev. 217; Speech and "Speech"
- Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67
Georgetown L. J. 899 (1979). For a sampling of Van Alstyne's First Amendment publications, see
The First Amendment and the Free Press: A Comment on Some New Trends and Some Old
Theories, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1980); A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 Cal. L. Rev.




There are three possible reasons for the paucity of conservative
commentary on the freedom of the press. First, some conservatives may
agree with the general trend of the Court's decisionmaking toward
greater deference to majoritarian decisions. They may expect that even-
tually the Court will come around to their way of thinking. Conse-
quently, they may not have an incentive to push the Court in the right
direction.
Second, conservatives may not share much of a unified position on
the First Amendment. At the very least, conservatives often differ in
their preferences for libertarianism (favoring the deregulation of the
broadcasting industry)15 9 or for a socially conservative-oriented majori-
tarianism (favoring less judicial interference with regulation of offensive
speech or aggressive press coverage). For example, Bork has sharply
chided the Rehnquist Court for protecting offensive symbolic conduct 160
and suggested that "the entire enterprise of the Supreme Court in New
York Times v. Sullivan, which laid down new rules making it more dif-
ficult for public figures to maintain actions for defamation, was
illegitimate. '" 1 61
Third, some conservatives may not discuss the freedom of the press
because their traditional arguments are unlikely to produce the results
they, desire. For example, conservatives have criticized liberals for not
adhering closely enough to the text or to the original understanding of
the broadly phrased constitutional provisions.' 62 Yet the text of the
First Amendment speaks categorically and seems to envision substan-
tial need for aggressive judicial enforcement of the constitutional norms
embodied within it. Its history is, even according to Bork, not so clear
as to preclude the necessity for consulting other sources for guidance.' 63
The dearth of conservative First Amendment scholarship has two
consequences for the future of the freedom of the press. First, it does
not portend much creative or aggressive decisionmaking by the Court in
this area. The Court is not prone to follow liberal scholarship on the
freedom of the press, and none of the present Justices are noted for
expertise in First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, Bollinger, Powe,
and Smolla do not characterize any current Supreme Court Justice as a
prominent thinker on the freedom of the press. Consequently, one won-
159. See Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 120-21 (cited in note 8). For example, the
Federal Communications Commission has recently indicated that it is willing to reconsider the
rules barring the owners of television networks or stations from buying cable outlets.
160. See Bork, The Tempting of America at 127-28 (cited in note 6) (criticizing the Court's
decision in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), which held that flag-burning which expresses
political protest is protected speech under the First Amendment).
161. Bork, The Tempting of America at 168.
162. See note 6.
163. See Bork, 47 Ind. L. J. at 22 (cited in note 155).
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ders to whom or to what the Justices will turn for intellectual guidance
on issues involving the freedom of the press.
Moreover, there are many important opinions, such as Sullivan,
that the present Court may have decided differently but that it still
must try to apply. While many of these precedents run counter to the
Court's conservative ideology, the Court will probably not overrule
many of those decisions because of the widespread political, social, and
legal expectations built around them.
16 4
Second, the scarcity of conservative commentary on the freedom of
the press has left the entire playing field to the liberals. Hence, liberals
are free to inculcate their visions of freedom of the press in elected offi-
cials, students, future judges, and the public. Liberals like Bollinger,
Powe, and Smolla have not hesitated to suggest the moral values they
think elected officials should take into account in making laws. More-
over, although Bollinger agrees with Bork that more deference should
be paid to majoritarian decisions, he exhorts policymakers to do better
even though many of their unwise efforts pass constitutional muster.
Further, Bollinger argues that the Court still has some responsibility to
provide moral leadership (rhetorical or otherwise) in freedom of the
press cases. 16 5
Perhaps one example will illustrate how the different attitudes that
conservatives and liberals hold about the Court's capacity for moral
leadership would work themselves out in practice. Both Bollinger and
Smolla praise the virtues of a tolerant society and urge the Court to
strike down hate speech regulations, although they acknowledge the
noxiousness of the speech involved and the need for people to be dis-
criminating in the kinds of ideas they hold and the language with which
they try to express them.
166
While conservatives have not written much about the constitution-
ality of hate speech laws, it is likely that the Rehnquist Court would
strike them down either because such laws are not sufficiently narrowly
tailored or because a hostile majority does not have the power to silence
a minority's noxious political speech. 1 7 The ironic twist would then be
164. See Gerhardt, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 79, 87-90 (cited in note 26) (arguing that prece-
dents such as Sullivan are virtually immune to reconsideration because there are so many political,
legal, social, and economic expectations that they will not be overruled).
165. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 41-43 (cited in note 8). Bork shies away from these
latter positions because he is a moral skeptic: he believes that the Court's only job is to define
precisely the few issues that original intent indicates should be removed from legislatures, and he
claims that once issues are within legislative discretion, the outcomes cannot be defended as being
morally correct or superior but rather only as being a legitimate exercise of majoritarian will. Bork,
The Tempting of America at 241-50 (cited in note 6).
166. See notes 28 and 61 and accompanying text.
167. Another possibility is that the Court, like Robert Bork, would support hate speech laws
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the cumulative effect of the Rehnquist Court's civil rights jurisprudence
under which minorities would lose in the Supreme Court when they ask
for special treatment from harmful legislation and when they persuade
majorities to protect them from serious harms. Thus, by design or de-
fault, the Court's likely statist-orientation could result in its refusal to
shape or direct community values on race relations. If we are a better
country because of such a statist ideology, the Court should do what
Bollinger and Smolla say it should then do: Tell us why we are a better
society for not tolerating distasteful speech and provide some guidance
on the moral and political consequences of the speech regulations that
could still pass constitutional muster. 16
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VI. CONCLUSION
Bollinger suggests that a "great intellectual transformation" is un-
folding with respect to the freedom of the press, 6 and his book encour-
to the extent they regulated expressive conduct. Compare Bork, The Tempting of America at 126-
28, 333-36 (cited in note 6). Bork would argue that a legislature may outlaw an expressive act such
as flag-burning or cross-burning because the conduct involved can be punished despite its expres-
siveness. The Rehnquist Court has in fact already shown a limit to its protection or tolerance of
offensive expression. See Barnes u. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460, 2461 (1991) (conclud-
ing that nude performance dancing "is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment" but that the requirement that such dancers wear pasties and G-strings does not
violate the First Amendment because the public nudity statute was not directed at nude dancing
and thus had only an "incidental" effect on constitutionally protected activity). Nevertheless,
Bork's argument does not recognize that flag-burning or cross-burning occurs only for expressive
purposes and that any law punishing such conduct exists solely to silence the offensive expression.
If the Court were to adopt Bork's view, it would be abdicating a leadership role in shaping moral
values embodied in the constitutional language and would be approving the majority's laws not
because they were good or wise or made us better people but solely because they embodied a
majoritarian preference.
168. It is also possible that, due to conservative influence, the future of freedom of the press
will belong only to those who can afford it. The owners of newspapers or television stations are free
to voice their views, and an individual is free to burn his or her own flag in political protest. But
the Court might turn a deaf ear to someone who has little property or who cannot buy space or
time to voice an opinion. See, for example, United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990)
(prohibiting people from protesting on the sidewalk in front of a post office); Rust v. Sullivan, il1
S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (indicating that the government can regulate the speech of family counseling
organizations it is subsidizing to exclude any mention of abortion). The effectiveness of the
messages excluded in Rust and Kokinda depended on the largesse of the government.
169. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 143 (cited in note 8). According to Bollinger, "the
question to be answered is whether the virtues of freedom of the press have become so internalized
in our culture, by government and by the society at large, that society can afford to move, even if
only very gradually, in the direction of new forms of self-correction." Id. at 142-43. His tentative
answer is that "the vastly different First Amendment analyses for the print media and for the
electronic media, together with the very different analyses for restrictions on speech and for re-
strictions on access to information, are gradually coming together." Id. at 151. He hopes to per-
suade people to "bring into being a more integrated and complex analysis of the idea of freedom of
the press, one that already has roots in places like the fairness doctrine-and the central image of
New York Times v. Sulllivan will be displaced." Id.
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ages people to trust the orientation of the state and the Court toward
more regulation of the press. Powe and Smolla take a contrary position,
expressing distrust in the government's capacity to regulate the press to
improve public debate or the press's performance and expressing trust
in the Court, the press, and the people to secure an autonomous press
to check government abuse.
These disparate views reflect the dynamism of liberal thought on
the freedom of the press. The tensions reflected within Bollinger's,
Powe's, and Smolla's books and within liberal thought in general are
not faults but rather signs of self-reflection and self-criticism. Their
books challenge their conservative counterparts to offer alternative vi-
sions of the freedom of the press, particularly now that conservatives
control the White House and the federal judiciary. But if the liberals,
with all of their complexity of thought and passion for clarifying the
political and moral values that should guide public decisionmaking, will
not write the future of the freedom of the press, we are left to wonder
who will write it, what will they say, and, besides the liberals, who will
care.
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